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Abstract 
Abductive reasoning (roughly speaking, find an explanation for observations out of hypothe- 
ses) has been recognized as an important principle of common-sense reasoning. Since logical 
knowledge representation is commonly based on nonclassical formalisms like default logic, au- 
toepistemic logic, or circumscription, it is necessary to perform abductive reasoning from theories 
(i.e., knowledge bases) of nonclassical logics. In this paper, we investigate how abduction can 
be performed from theories in default logic. In particular, we present a basic model of abduc- 
tion from default theories. Different modes of abduction are plausible, based on credulous and 
skeptical default reasoning; they appear useful for different applications uch as diagnosis and 
planning. Moreover, we thoroughly analyze the complexity of the main abductive reasoning tasks, 
namely finding an explanation, deciding relevance of a hypothesis, and deciding necessity of a 
hypothesis. These problems are intractable ven in the propositional case, and we locate them 
into the appropriate slots of the polynomial hierarchy. However, we also present known classes 
of default theories for which abduction is tractable. Moreover, we also consider first-order default 
theories, based on domain closure and the unique names assumption. In this setting, the abduction 
tasks are decidable, but have exponentially higher complexity than in the propositional case. @ 
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1. Introduction 
Abductive reasoning has been recognized as an important principle of common-sense 
reasoning having fruitful applications in a number of areas such diverse as model- 
based diagnosis [ 16,45,46], speech recognition [ 301, maintenance of database views 
[ 341, and vision [ 121. Various formalizations of abductive reasoning have been pro- 
posed, among which set-covering-based approaches [ 7,431 and logic-based approaches 
[ 15,16,45,46] are well known. These two types basically differ in the way domain 
knowledge is represented. Roughly, in the set-covering approach, the domain knowl- 
edge is represented by a function e which maps subsets X of hypotheses, which 
are atomic entities representing all possible disorders, to subsets e(X) of manifesta- 
tions, i.e. observed symptoms. The set e(X) can be seen as the explanation power 
of X; if X explains all manifestations M, i.e., e(X) = M, then X is an abduc- 
tive explanation. On the other hand, in the logic-based approach the domain knowl- 
edge is represented by a logical theory T in some language. A subset X of hy- 
potheses is an abductive explanation, if T augmented by X derives the manifesta- 
tions M. For a more detailed comparison of these and other approaches to abduction, 
see [22]. 
Until now, mainly logical abduction from theories of classical logic has been stud- 
ied. However, logical knowledge representation is commonly based on nonclassical 
formalisms like default logic, autoepistemic logic, or circumscription. Thus, in such 
situations it is necessary to perform abductive reasoning from theories (i.e., knowl- 
edge bases) of nonclassical logics; in a sense, this is orthogonal to what is known 
as hybrid reasoning, i.e., reasoning on a knowledge base built using different for- 
malisms [ 21. 
Since default logic [52] is one of the most used logical knowledge representation 
languages that emerged in the field of nonmonotonic reasoning (cf. [ 18,53]), it is 
important to investigate how abduction can be performed from theories (W, D) in de- 
fault logic. In this paper, we address this problem. We start by first considering some 
motivating examples; they show that abductive reasoning in default logic is needed, and 
lead us towards a formal model of abduction from default theories. 
Example 1.1. Consider the following set of default rules, which represent some knowl- 
edge about Bill’s skiing habits: 
D= 
‘t 
: vkiing(Bil1) weekend : -snowing : -mowing 
yskiing( Bill) ’ 1 skiing( Bill) ’ lsnowing ’ 
The defaults intuitively state the following: Bill is usually not out for skiing; on the 
weekend, Bill is usually out for skiing, unless it is snowing; and usually, it is not 
snowing. For the certain knowledge W = {weekend} (encoding that it is Saturday or 
Sunday), the default theory T = (W, D) has one extension which contains -snowing and 
skiing( Bill). 
Suppose now that we observe that Bill is not out for skiing (which is not consistent 
with the extension). Abduction means to find an explanation for this observation, that is, 
to identify a set of facts, chosen from a set of hypotheses, whose presence in the theory 





Fig. I. A computer network. 
at hand would derive the observation lskiing(BilZ), i.e., cause that +Gng(BiZl) is in 
the extension. We find such an explanation by adopting the hypothesis snowing. Indeed, 
if we add snowing to W, we obtain for the default theory T’ = ({weekend, snowing}, D) 
a single extension, which contains lskiing( Bill). We say that snowing is abduced from 
the observation lskiing(Bill), or that it is an abductive explanation of lskiing(Bill). 
Observe that the description of the above situation requires the specification of some 
default properties that cannot be represented properly in classical logic. 
Example 1.2. Assume that information about a computer network is represented using 
default logic. The default theory T = (W, D) described next comprises in a simplified 
setting knowledge about relationships between the status of a site (working or not), 
connections between sites, and reachability of one site from another (which can be 
established by a path following direct connections), together with information about 
connections: 
w= < 
/ Vx. works(x) > path( x, x) , 




‘dx. conn( x, x) , 
\ Vx, y. conn( x, y) 3 conn(y, x) 
The first two formulas in W state that if a site works, then there is a trivial path 
from this site to itself, and that if a site does not work, then it cannot be reached 
from any node. The facts conn( s1, ~2) state direct connections between sites. For con- 
venience, reflexivity and symmetry of the connectivity relationship is taken care of by 
the respective axioms.3 A graphical representation of these connections is depicted in 
Fig. 1.’ 
’ Negated facts lconn( ~1, sz), stating that there is no direct connection between sites $1 and ~2, are 
omitted. If desired, they can be derived using the closed world assumption, by introducing defaults 
: lconn(x,y)/~conn(x,y) in D. 
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The default rules are as follows. : worh( x) puth(x, y) : : -yuth(x, y) 
D= 
works(x) ’ reuche.s(x,y) ’ v-euches(x,y) ’ 
. puth(x,y) Aconn(y,z) Aworks : 
paw% z> 
The first rule states that a site works by default; the next two rules relate paths to 
reachability, by adopting that x reaches y if a path from x to y provably exists, and does 
not reach it otherwise. The last rules states that a path can be extended by following 
a direct connection, if the site at the other end is working; here, it is assumed for 
simplicity that the connections are reliable, i.e., no communication failures occur. 
In this representation, we implicitly adopt the common domain closure axiom Vx. 
x = Cl v.. . V x = c,, where cl , . . . , c, are all the objects (respectively individuals) of 
the underlying domain, which are those mentioned in T (in our case, all sites), and the 
axiom of the unique names assumption /jiCj ci # cj, which expresses that all objects 
mentioned in T are different. 
In this setting, the default theory T has a single extension E, in which all sites work 
and each site reaches any other site; notice that reaches (x. y) is derivable iff there is a 
path x = se, si,. . . , s, = y in the network such that worh( si) is true for all i = 0,. . . , n 
andconn(sj_i,sj) istrueforallj=l,...,n. 
We remark that the knowledge represented in T cannot be easily represented in clas- 
sical logic. Indeed, reachability between sites refers to the transitive closure of a graph; 
it is well known that transitive closure cannot be expressed in classical first-order logic 
(cf. [ l] ). Explicit storage in terms of e.g. ground atoms con&( ~1, $2) has the ob- 
vious disadvantages of inflexibility and maintenance cost, if the network is extended 
or its topology changes. However, default logic allows for an elegant representation of 
transitive closure and reachability. 
Suppose now we observe that site a works but site e is not reachable from it, i.e., 
works(u) and veuches (a, e) are true (which is not the case in the extension of T) . If 
we look for an explanation of these manifestations in terms of sites that are down (while 
we disallow for assertion of facts puth( X, y) >, we find that-as expected-lworks( e) is 
an explanation; indeed, from the formula Vx, y. -7works(x) 3 veuches(y, x) it follows 
then immediately -veuches (a, e) , and, by the first default rule in D, works(u) is true. 
Other possible explanations exist besides Two&s(e). In fact, any subset S G {b, . . . , 
f} of sites whose failure causes a network partition so that a and e lie in different 
partitions gives rise to an explanation, by adopting Two&s(s) for every s E S. Thus, 
e.g. Tworks( b), lworks( f) and Two&s(c), lworks(d), Two&s(f) are possible ex- 
planations as well; on the other hand, lworks(c), Tworks( d) is not an explanation. 
The examples suggest a formalization of abduction from default theories in a frame- 
work similar to the one for abduction from classical theories: Given a theory T, a set 
of observations (or manifestations) M is to be explained, by adopting a set of formulas 
(an explanation) E, which are from a set of hypotheses (or abducibles) H, so that 
T U E derives M (where, of course, T U E is consistent). 
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In Example 1.1, we had M = {lskiing(Bill) } and H = {snowing}, and in Exam- 
ple 1.2, M = {works(a), vmzches(a,e)} and H = {~works(a), . . .,-works(f)}. 
In the above examples, the default theories have a single default extension. However, 
in general, a default theory may have multiple (or even no) extensions; just assume in 
Example 1.2 the information is available that either site b or site d is down, which is 
naturally represented by adding the formula Two&s(b) V Two&x(d) to W; then, the 
resulting default theory has two extensions, one containing lworks(b) and the other 
containing lworks( d). 
As a consequence of multiple extensions, (deductive) inference from default theories 
comes in different modes; usually, credulous inference, under which a formula 4 is 
inferred from a default theory T (denoted T I-, I$) iff 4 belongs to at least one 
extension of T, and skeptical inference, under which 4 follows from T (T FS 4) iff 4 
belongs to all extensions of T. Accordingly, the variants of credulous abduction, where 
inference of the observations is based on kc, and skeptical abduction, which is based on 
ks, from default theories arise. 
In practice, the user will choose credulous or skeptical abduction on the basis of the 
particular application domain. Both modes of abduction appear to be useful and relevant. 
To emphasize this, we argue that credulous abduction is well suited for diagnosis, while 
skeptical abduction is adequate for planning (see Section 3). Notice that the applicability 
and use of abduction in these domains is well known, starting from Poole’s work on 
abductive logic-based diagnosis [ 44-461 and the work of Eshghi and others on abductive 
planning and plan recognition, cf. [ 24,421. 
On the computational side, we have to ask for the complexity of abduction from 
default logic, in order to find suitable algorithms for abduction. Towards this, we an- 
alyze the complexity of the main abductive reasoning tasks, formulated in the context 
of default abduction. Informally, these tasks amount to deciding whether an explanation 
exists (called Consistency), whether a particular hypothesis belongs to some expla- 
nation (Relevance) and whether a particular hypothesis belongs to every explanation 
(Necessity). 
Consistency is self-explanatory; Releuance is important to separate hypotheses that 
contribute to an explanation from those which do not, and thus supports focusing the 
reasoning process. Necessity is important for computing the core of an explanation, 
which consists of the intersection of all explanations. 
For classical theories, the complexity of logic-based abduction has been widely studied 
in the propositional context [ 6,22,56]. Furthermore, the complexity of reasoning from 
propositional default theories has been thoroughly analyzed in [ 27,35,58,59]. The 
results showed that both abduction and default reasoning are harder than classical logic, 
and render problems that are complete for classes of the second level of the polynomial 
hierarchy (in particular, for Zy and II!), while classical logic is complete for classes of 
the first level (in particular, NP and CO-IV). 
Clearly, abduction from default theories is intractable as well, since default reasoning 
occurs as a subtask. However, it is not immediately clear how the complexities of abduc- 
tion and default reasoning combine. We answer this question by precisely determining 
the complexity of each default abduction task, and locate it in the appropriate slot of the 
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polynomial hierarchy proving completeness for the suitable class. The main complexity 
results can be summarized as follows: 
Default abduction is at least as hard as (deductive) default reasoning. The “eas- 
iest” setting is credulous default abduction, which is complete for Z! and II!, 
respectively; on the other hand, the “hardest” task--Relevance in skeptical default 
abduction based on minimal explanations (i.e., explanations that do not contain 
any other explanation properly)-is complete for XI, which is loosely speaking 
the “square” of C!. Other settings yield abduction problems that are complete for 
well-known classes in between 2; respectively II! and 2:. 
Skeptical default abduction is precisely one level harder than credulous default 
abduction in the polynomial hierarchy. This contrasts with usual results for non- 
monotonic formalisms, where skeptical reasoning has complexity complementary 
to credulous reasoning (typically, II! and CF), and is at the same level in the 
polynomial hierarchy. 
The Relevance problem has complexity complementary to the Necessity problem. 
Minimality of explanations is a source of complexity for Relevance, and makes the 
problem harder. This contrasts with results for abduction from classical theories 
[=I. 
Since abduction from default theories is intractable, it is important to find problem 
restrictions under which polynomial time algorithms are possible. For default reasoning, 
the border between tractable and intractable fragments has been sharply marked by 
the excellent work of Kautz and Selman [ 3.51 and Stillman [ 581. As default abduction 
builds on default reasoning, tractability of default abduction has to be based on a tractable 
fragment for default reasoning. Following this approach, we point out two classes of 
default theories from which abduction tasks are tractable. These are literal-Horn default 
theories, where W consists of literals and D contains only so called Horn defaults, and 
Krom-pf-normal default theories, where W consists of Krom clauses (clauses of size 
< 2) and D contains only prerequisite-free normal defaults that allow to conclude a 
conjunction of literals; see Section 5 for details. 
We also discuss the complexity of abduction from first-order default theories. Of 
course, this is undecidable in general as first-order logic is undecidable. However, 
adopting the common domain closure axiom and the unique names assumption, we 
obtain that abduction from default theories is decidable. Here, the complexity parallels 
the complexity of the propositional case, increased by an exponential; this means that 
the abduction problems we consider are provably intractable. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The following Section 2 recalls the 
necessary concepts of default logic and complexity theory, and introduces some basic 
notation. Section 3 presents the framework for abduction from default theories and 
formally states the main abductive reasoning tasks in it. In the course of that, the use 
of credulous versus skeptical abduction is discussed. Section 4 describes and discusses 
the results of our analysis of the complexity of default abduction in the propositional 
context; the subsequent Section 5 addresses the issue of tackling default abduction in 
practice, and focuses on tractable cases. The complexity of abduction from first-order 
default theories is addressed in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper and 
outlines issues for further research. 
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In order to improve readability, the proofs of the results, except a few short, transparent 
proofs, have been moved to Appendices A and B. 
2. Preliminaries and notation 
We assume that the reader knows about the basic concepts of default logic [ 521 (cf. 
also [ 381 for an extensive study of the subject). 
Let L be a first-order predicate language. A default theory is a pair T = (W, D) of a 





where (Y(X) (the prerequisite), /?I (x) , . . . , flnt (x) (the jus@cations), and y(x) (the 
conclusion) are from C, and the free variables of all these formulas are among the 
variables in x = x1, . . . , x,. We omit (Y and any pi if it is a tautology. If no free 
variables occur, the default is closed. A default theory (R D) is closed if every default 
in D is closed. 
The semantics of a closed default theory T = (u! D) is defined in terms of extensions. 
A set E C L is an extension of T iff E = Us Ei, where 
E. = W, 
E D, Ei I- (~7 ~pl # E, . . . , -pm $ E , 4 
Y > 
for i > 0, 
where F is classical inference and Th( .) denotes classical deductive closure. The ex- 
tensions of a general default theory T = (W, D) are by definition the extensions of 
the closure of T, cl(T), which is the default theory cZ( T) = (K {d( x)r 1 d(x) E 
D, g is a ground substitution for x}). 
A default theory may have several (or even no) extensions in general. It is well 
known that different extensions El and E2 are incomparable, i.e., El C E2 implies 
El = E2, and that L is an extension of T iff W is not consistent. 
Each extension of a closed default theory T = (W, D) can be characterized in terms 
of its generating defaults. Let for any set S of closed formulas denote by GD( S, T) the 
set of all defaults F E D such that S F (Y and ~/3i $ S, for all i = 1,. . . , m, and 
denote by concl( D’) the set of all conclusions of defaults in the set D’. Then, 
Proposition 2.1 (see [52]). Let E be an extension of the closed default theory T = 
(W, D). Then, E = Th(Wuconcl(GD(E,T))). 
4 We use here “ISi I- (Y” instead of “a E Ei” as usual, which gives rise to the same concept. 
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On the other hand, if a deductively closed formula set S satisfies S = Z%( W u 
concf( GD( S, T))), then S is not necessarily an extension; however, it is true if T is 
prerequisite free, i.e., the prerequisite of each default in L) is a tautology. 
A default rule is called normal if it is of form y. The class of normal default 
theories, where each default in D is normal, is considered to be one of the most 
important fragments of default logic. Normal default theories always have extensions; 
moreover, they enjoy the property of semi-monotonicity: If E is an extension of a normal 
default theory (w D) and D’ > D contains only normal defaults, then (w D’) has an 
extension Et 2 E [52]. 
The standard variants of inference from a default theory T are credulous inference 
(denoted l-,), under which 4 is inferred iff 4 belongs to at least one extension of T, and 
skeptical inference (F-,), under which 4 follows iff 4 belongs to all extensions of T. 
For NP-completeness and complexity theory, cf. [ 3 11. The classes Zi and II: of the 
polynomial hierarchy are defined as follows: 
Zg = II! = P and CI = NPzi-1, II: = CO-Z! for all k > 1. 
In particular, NP = Zy, co-NP = II:, and Ci = NPNP. Intuitively, NP’i-1 models 
computability by a nondeterministic polynomial time algorithm which may use an oracle 
(loosely speaking, a subprogram without cost) for solving a problem in XI_, . In the 
context of nonmonotonic reasoning, an oracle for NP (which allows to decide classical 
propositional satisfiability and hence in practice also inference t-> is common. 
The class Di is defined as the class of problems that consist of the conjunction 
of two (independent) problems from ZL and II L. Notice that for all k 2 1, clearly 
C; L DE L Xi+,,; both inclusions are widely conjectured to be strict, since equality of 
the left or the right one would imply the collapse of the polynomial hierarchy. Recall 
that a problem A is complete for a class C iff A belongs to C and every problem in C 
is reducible to it by a polynomial time transformation; intuitively, a problem complete 
for C is the hardest problem in C. 
It appeared that many computational problems in nonmonotonic reasoning are com- 
plete for classes at the lower end of the polynomial hierarchy [9,41]. In particular, it 
is well known that deciding whether a propositional default theory has an extension is 
X:-complete, and that credulous reasoning and skeptical reasoning from default theories 
are complete for I;; and II;, respectively [ 27,581. The complexity remains unchanged 
if inconsistent extensions are excluded and, for the latter problems, if default theories 
are in addition normal [ 27,591. Cases of lower complexity and tractable fragments were 
identified in [ 35,581. The complexity of logic-based abduction from classical theories 
has been analyzed in [ 622,561 (cf. [ 71 for a comprehensive analysis of the set- 
covering approach). Basically, abduction has the same complexity as default reasoning, 
and bears XT-complete and @-complete reasoning problems. 
3. Formalizing default abduction 
In this section, we describe a basic formal model for abduction from propositional 
default theories and state the main decisional reasoning tasks for abductive reasoning. 
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Our formalization of an abduction scenario is as follows. 
Definition 3.1. A default abduction problem (DAP) is a quadruple (H, M, u! D) where 
H is a set of ground (i.e., variable-free) literals (called hypotheses, or abducibles), 
M is a set of ground literals (called observations, or manifestations), and (W, D) is a 
default theory. 
We say a DAP P = (H, M, W, D) is normal iff (W, D) is normal. 
This definition reflects the intention that abduction explains particular observations, 
stated by possibly negated facts, in terms of a collection of elementary hypotheses, which 
are possibly negated facts. Such a setting is common in logic-based abduction, cf. [ 561. 
In fact, it is not a shortcoming over allowing arbitrary closed formulas as hypotheses 
or manifestations, since for each nonliteral hypothesis (respectively manifestation) 4 a 
new propositional atom a4 might be introduced, and after adding the formula a4 +-+ C$ 
to W, 4 can equivalently be replaced by a+. 
If all positive (respectively negative) ground literals p(t) from a predicate p are 
hypotheses, it is convenient to say that p (respectively -p) is abducible and include p 
(respectively -p) in H rather than all literals p(t) (respectively lp( t) ) . Accordingly, 
in Example 1.2, ~works is abducible, and the set H is simply H = { ~works} instead of 
H = {-works(u), . . . , -works(f)}. 
We next formally define explanations, based on credulous respectively skeptical default 
inference. 
Definition 3.2. Let P = (H, M, u! D) be a DAP, and let E 2 H. Then, E is a credulous 
explanation for P iff 
(i) (WU E,D) t, M, and 
(ii) (WUE,D) h as a consistent extension. 
Similarly, E is a skeptical explanation for P iff 
(i) (W U E, D) Fs M, and 
(ii) (WUE,D) h as a consistent extension. 
The existence of a consistent extension for (W U E, D) (in this case, all extensions are 
consistent) assures that the explanation E is consistent with the knowledge represented 
in (W, D). This requirement is analogous to the usual consistency criterion in abduction 
from classical theories. 
It is common in abductive reasoning to prune the set of all explanations and to focus, 
guided by some principle of explanation preference, on a set of preferred explanations. 
The most important such principle is, following Occam’s principle of parsimony, to 
prefer nonredundant explanations, i.e., explanations which do not contain any other 
explanation properly (cf. [ 37,43,56] ) . We refer to such explanations as minimal explu- 
nations. (See [ 7,22,43] for other preferences on explanations.) 
Example 1.1 (continued). Suppose the certain knowledge W is extended by Vx. 
broken-leg(x) 13 lskiing( x) to Wl. Then, for M = {vkiing(BiZl)}, H = {snowing, 
broken-leg}, the explanations for (H, M, WI, D), under credulous as well as skeptical 
inference, are: 
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El = {snowing}, 
E2 = {broken_leg(Bill)}, 
E3 = (snowing, broken_leg(BilZ)}. 
The minimal explanations are El and E2; they are clearly preferred to E3. 
Example 1.2 (continued). Reconsider to explain M = {works(a), Treuches( a, e) } from 
H = {-works}. The explanations for (H, M, vr! D) correspond l-l to the subsets of 
sites S f {b, . . . , f) whose simultaneous failure causes a and e to be in two different 
partitions of the network. The minimal explanations thus correspond to the minimal such 
sets S, which are: {e}, {b, f}, and {c, d, f}. Intuitively, they amount to the explanations 
a rational agent is willing to accept, namely that e is down, that b and f are down, or 
that c, d and f are down. 
In the sequel, we will write Exp(P) for the set of explanations for the DAP P, ab- 
stracting from the chosen type of explanations (credulous, skeptical, minimal credulous, 
or minimal skeptical). 
3.1. Credulous versus skeptical abduction 
As already mentioned in Section 1, both modes of abduction-credulous and skeptical 
abduction-appear to be useful in practice. For example, credulous abduction is suitable 
for diagnosis, while skeptical planning is appropriate for planning, which we discuss 
next. 
3.1.1. Credulous abduction: diagnosis 
Consider a system represented by a default theory T = (W D). If the system receives 
some input, reflected by adding a set A of facts to W, then each extension of T’ = 
(W u A, D) is a possible evolution of the system, i.e., each extension represents a 
possible reaction of the system to A. 
Abductive diagnosis consists, loosely speaking, in deriving from an observed system 
state (given by M), a suitable input A which caused this evolution (cf. [46] ). Now, 
since each extension of (W U A, D) is a possible evolution of the system with input 
A, we can assert that A is a possible input that caused F if (W U A, D) I-, F. Thus, 
diagnostic problems can be naturally represented by abductive problems with credulous 
inference. 
In the network example above, finding an explanation for the observations works(u) 
and -reaches( a, e) is a diagnostic problem; minimal explanations correspond to the 
intuitive diagnoses, i.e., alternative collections of possibly broken machines. However, 
each of the explanations Ei is acceptable under both credulous and skeptical inference, 
since the default theory (W U Ei, D) has a single extension. 
To show the use of credulous inference for diagnosis, we consider the scenario where 
the additional information is available that either b or d is down, i.e., W contains 
also the formula -works(b) V Two&s(d). Then, the default theory (W, D) has two 
extensions, one in which b is down (while d is up) and another one in which d is 
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down (while b is up). Suppose now we want to find a diagnosis for the observa- 
tions (works(a), veaches(a, e)) in which the actual status of b and d is open; that 
is, we focus on a partial, consistency-based diagnosis in terms of hypotheses from 
{7works(c),7works(e), ~work.s(f>}, which might be extendible to a complete diag- 
nosis, in which the status of each site is pinned down. Intuitively, the fact ~works(f) 
is then an acceptable diagnosis; in fact, it allows for a complete diagnosis (in which 
~works( b) is true and thus all paths from a to e are broken). As easily checked, 
E = {lworks(f)} is a credulous explanation for the DAP P = (H, M, W, Dl) where 
M = {works(a), ~reuche.s(a,e)} and H = {lworks(c), lworks(e), ~works(f)}. Note, 
however, that E is not a skeptical explanation, since (W U E, D) has an extension in 
which reaches (a, e) is true. 
Other diagnostic tasks in which credulous default abduction is appropriate arise in 
a slightly modified scenario; for example, if the knowledge about connections between 
sites is not complete. Assume it is known that f is connected to either e or b, but not 
to which of them, and a closed world assumption default ‘~~~$~*~i is present in the 
default theory. Then, if we concentrate on (partial) diagnoses in terms of site failures, 
Tworks( b) would be acceptable for the above manifestations M. In fact, {Iworks( b)} 
is a credulous explanation P = (Z-l, M, W; D) where H = {Tworks}. 
3.1.2. Skeptical abduction: planning 
Suppose now that we want that the system evolves into a certain state (described by 
a set F of facts), and we have to determine the “right” input (i.e., actions) that enforces 
this state of the system (planning). In this case it is not sufficient to choose an input A 
such that F is true in some possible evolution of the system; rather, we look for an A 
such that F is true in all possible evolutions, as we want be sure that the system reacts 
in that particular way. In other words, we look for A such that (W U A, D) ks F. Hence, 
planning activities can be represented by abductive problems with skeptical inference. 
Let us consider a simple planning problem in the network example. Suppose that a 
packet should be sent from site a to e. In particular, a route for sending the packet 
from a to b should be generated, taking into account possible knowledge that some sites 
might not work. 
To model this, we augment the default theory as follows. First, a formula is added to 
W that states a packet can be sent to a single node only, yielding 
WI = WU{Vx,y,z.send(x,y) Asend(x,z) > y= z}; 
we augment D to 
: Tsend(x,y) send(x,y) : -conn(x,y) V~euches(x,y) 
vend( x, y) ’ I 
DI =DU 
send(x,y) : t(x,y) t(x,y) Asend(y,z) : t(x,z) 
t(x*Y> ’ t(x, z> 
here, _L is a symbol for contradiction and r(x, y) states that the packet is transported 
from x to y. The augmented default theory is Tt = (WI, Dl). 
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The planning problem can be solved by finding a (skeptical) explanation for M = 
{t(a, e)} using H = {send} as hypotheses, i.e., ground facts send(st, ~2). For the 
original W (which describes the network in Fig. 1, and no site failures are known), we 
then obtain three minimal explanations for (H, M, K Dl), namely 
El = {send(a,b),send(b,c),send(c,e)}, 
E2 = {send(a,b),send(b,d),send(d,e)}, 
EX = {send(a, f), send(f, e)}; 
all three are in fact credulous as well as skeptical explanations. Minimality of expla- 
nations means each routing is minimal, i.e., contains no superfluous send actions; in 
particular, it avoids looping (e.g. EJ = {send( a, 6) , se&( b, e) , send( c, e) , send( e, d) , 
se&( b, d)} is a nonminimal explanation that amounts to a routing in a loop. Clearly, 
looping could also be explicitly excluded by an axiom in WI stating that each node can 
receive a packet from only one node. 
Notice that adding the information yworks( b) V ~works( d) to WI eliminates two out 
of the three minimal explanations, namely El and E2; only Es remains as a skeptical 
explanation. This matches perfectly our intuitive expectations: there is an extension in 
which b is down, and therefore all routes for sending the packet that pass through b 
are not fully reliable. In particular, the routes corresponding to El and E2 are not fully 
reliable and have to be dropped. 
Finally, if it is known that besides Two&s(b) V ~works(d) also ~works(f> is true, 
then no longer a skeptical explanation exists. This perfectly matches our intuitive ex- 
pectation: there is an extension in which b and f are down simultaneously, and since 
all paths from a to e go through either b or f, it is impossible to send in this extension 
the packet from a to e. 
3.2. Abductive reasoning tusks 
The following properties of a hypothesis in a DAP P are important with respect to 
computing explanations. 
Definition 3.3. Let P = (H, M, u! D) be a DAP and h E H. Then, h is relevant for 
P iff h E E for some E E Exp( P) , and h is necessary for P iff h E E for every 
E E Exp(P). 
The opposite of necessity is also termed dispensability (cf. [ 321). In Example 1 .l, 
snowing is both relevant and necessary, as E = {snowing} is the only explanation. 
The main decisional problems in abductive reasoning amount to the following. Given 
aDAPP=(H,M,WD), 
l Consistency: does there exist an explanation for P? 
a Relevance: is a given ground hypothesis h E H relevant for P, i.e., does h contribute 
to some explanation of P? 
l Necessity: is a given ground hypothesis h E H necessary for P, i.e., is h contained 
in all explanations of P? 
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Table 1 
Complexity of abduction from propositional default heories (completeness results) 
PDAP P = (H, M, u: D) Arbitrary explanations 
Problem: Credulous Skeptical 
Minimal explanations 
Credulous Skeptical 
Consistency 2; “5 2; “: 
Recognition: E E &p(P)? 2; DT D! “9 
E E &p(P) is minimal? “: “! 
Relevance =I “! 2; 2: 
Necessity “; “1 “: “I 
In the following section, we address the complexity of these problems in the propo- 
sitional context. 
4. Complexity results: propositional case 
In this section, we analyze the complexity of the main abductive reasoning tasks in 
the propositional context. 
A propositional default abduction problem (PDAP) is thus a DAP P = (H, M, W, D) 
such that H and M are sets of propositional formulas, and (W D) is a propositional 
default theory. For solving the abductive reasoning tasks, we suppose that the input 
PDAP P is finite, i.e., H, M, W, and D are finite. 
The main results on the complexity of abduction from general propositional default 
theories are summarized in Table 1. Each entry C represents completeness for the 
class C. In our analysis, we pay particular attention to normal PDAPs, since this class 
corresponds to the most important fragment of default logic. The results in Table 1, 
with the exception of recognizing a minimal credulous explanation, hold even if the 
underlying default theory (U: D) is normal. Thus like deduction, abduction from normal 
default theories is as hard as abduction from arbitrary default theories. 
The results can be commented and explained as follows. The “easiest” abductive 
reasoning tasks have the same complexity as (deductive) inference from default theories, 
namely Z! and II!, respectively, while the “hardest” task has complexity ZT (Relevance 
under minimal credulous explanations), which is, loosely speaking the “square” of Z!. 
The other tasks have intermediate complexity. 
As argued in [ 9,201, the level of the polynomial hierarchy at which a problem resides 
shows that the problem suffers from (at least) that many sources of inherent complexity, 
and they are intermingled so that, in a sense, they act “orthogonally”. For the hardest 
problem in Table 1 (Xi-completeness), we thus must have four such orthogonal sources 
of complexity. In fact, they can be identified as follows (cf. Fig. 2): 
( 1) classical deductive inference (t), 
(2) the number of extensions of (W U E, D), 
(3) the number of candidates E for a skeptical explanation, and 
(4) the number of possible smaller explanations (i.e., minimality); here these num- 
bers can be exponential in the problem size. 









1/ classical inference 1 
Fig. 2. Orthogonal sources of complexity for Relevance, in skeptical abduction using minimal explanations. 
If we compare credulous abduction to skeptical abduction, we find that for the main 
reasoning tasks, skeptical abduction is always precisely one level harder than credulous 
abduction. This contrasts with the results for many nonmonotonic reasoning formalisms 
(default logic, autoepistemic logic, circumscription, . . .) obtained so far (see [9,41]), 
where skeptical reasoning has complexity complementary to credulous reasoning (typ- 
ically, complete for II! while credulous reasoning is complete for 2;). The reason for 
this interesting phenomenon is that a credulous explanation and an extension proving the 
explanation property can be nondeterministically generated simultaneously, which saves 
one level in the hierarchy over skeptical explanations (see below for a more formal 
account). 
Minimality of extensions is a source of complexity for Relevance and causes an 
increase in complexity by one level in the polynomial hierarchy. However, it does not 
add to the complexity of Necessity due to the following simple fact. 
Proposition 4.1. Let P = (H, h4, K D) be a finite PDAP and let h E H. Then, h is 
necessary for P under minimal credulous (respectively skeptical) explanations iff h is 
necessary for P under credulous (respectively skeptical) explanations. 
Therefore, we shall not deal in our analysis explicitly with Necessity in the case of 
minimal explanations. 
The results for Relevance contrast with corresponding results for abduction from 
classical theories: there, minimality of explanation is not a source of complexity [ 221. 
This discrepancy can be explained by the fact that the inference relation I- underlying 
classical abduction is monotonic, while kC and t-s are nonmonotonic; monotonicity 
effects that the explanation space is well structured, so that minimality of an explanation 
can be decided by looking at few candidates for smaller explanations. This benign 
property does not apply to t, and t, inference, where still an exponential candidate 
space remains to be checked. 
By the results in Table 1, we are able to draw some conclusions about the relationship 
of default abduction to other forms of nonmonotonic reasoning. First, by virtue of com- 
plexity theory, the reasoning tasks that are complete for S! or II! can be polynomially 
transformed into an equivalent reasoning task in any of the classical nonmonotonic for- 
malisms such as default logic, autoepistemic logic, circumscription, etc. Thus, theorem 
provers for such formalisms, e.g., the DeReS system for default logic (cf. [ 13]), can be 
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fruitfully used for performing default abduction as well. Such polynomial transforma- 
tions can be extracted from the proofs of the complexity results, by simply composing 
transformations. In many cases, however, a direct and much simpler transformation can 
be found. In fact, we show below how default abduction can be transformed to classical 
default reasoning by means of a plain transformation. 
For the classes 21 and II!, not many nonmonotonic logics of this complexity have 
been known until recently. It was known that moderately grounded AEL has this com- 
plexity [ 2 1 ] ; it appeared that a family of similar so called ground logics has the same 
complexity [ 191. Moreover, the recent extension of default logic by transepistemic de- 
faults [ 501 is complete for ZF respectively III [ 511. Thus, the default abduction tasks 
in Table 1 that have this complexity can be efficiently translated into this logics and 
vice versa; implementations lack today, however. 
Finally, for the hardest reasoning task (XI-complete), there is no well-known non- 
monotonic logic of similar complexity; it landmarks a region of very hard nonmonotonic 
reasoning problems, and shows that intuitive reasoning tasks can grow quite complex. 
Besides the quantitative account, the above completeness results have also a qualitative 
aspect. They tell that a simple ad hoc algorithm for solving the reasoning tasks, which 
exhaustively searchs an exponential candidate space for each source of complexity, 
cannot be substantially improved with concern of solving the problem on all instances. 
For example, consider the straightforward algorithm in Fig. 3. There, it is assumed that 
a procedure skept-inf( W, D, 4) for skeptical inference of C#J from (W, D) is available 
(cf. the DeReS system [ 131)) and I is any contradiction. This algorithm is exponential, 
even if skept-inf is seen as a zero-cost oracle; the complexity result for this problem 
(ZI-completeness, which loosely speaking means Z;-completeness modulo skeptical 
inference), however, indicates that there is basically no substantially better algorithm 
that avoids the costly for-loops. (Of course, the loops can be optimized, but overall still 
an exponential effort is needed. An algorithm that uses exponential space might be able 
to get away with a single for-loop, e.g. by systematic and exhaustive state-space search 
for extensions.) 
Since all the results in Table 1 are negative with respect to efficient computation, we 
have to ask how to deal with the reasoning problems in practice. This will be addressed 
in Section 5. 
4.1. Arbitrary explanations 
A useful observation is that in general, the problems Relevance and Necessity can be 
easily reduced to Consistency and its complement, respectively, for both credulous and 
skeptical explanations. Indeed, the following is easily verified. 
Proposition 4.2. Let P = (H, M, W D) be a PDAP based on credulous or skeptical 
explanations, and let h E H. Then, E is an explanation for the PDAP (H\{ h}, M, W U 
{h},D) ifSEU {h} is an explanation for P. 
Proof. ( +> All extensions of (W U {h} U E, D) are consistent and contain M, and 
extensions exist. Hence, E U {h} is an explanation for P. 
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Algorithm Min-Skeptical-Relevance( H, M, K D, h) 
Input: A propositional DAP P = (H, M, K D), h E H. 
Output: “Yes” if h is relevant for P under minimal skeptical explanations, 
“No” otherwise. 
Procedure explanation(E) : boolean (* check if E is skeptical explanation *) 
begin 4 := conjunction of all literals in M; 
return skept-inf( W U E, D, 4) and not skept-inf( W U E, D, I); 
end explanation; 
begin 
for each E G H s.t. h E E do begin 
if explanation(E) then 
begin minexp := true; (* E is candidate for a minimal explanation *) 
for each E’ c E do if explanation( E’) then minexp := false; 
end; 
if minexp = true then begin output( “Yes”) ; halt end; 
end; 
output( “No”) ; 
end Min-Skeptical-Relevance. 
Fig. 3. Algorithm for Relevance. 
(G) E U {h} is an explanation for P means that some consistent extension of 
(WUEU{h},D) exists and that all (some) extensions contain M. Hence, E is an 
explanation for (H\(h), M, W U {h}, D). 0 
Corollary 4.3. Let P = (H, M, W D) be a PDAP and h E H. Then, 
(i) h is relevant for P ifs (H\{ h}, M, W U {h}, D) has an explanation and 
(ii) h is necessary for P ifs (H\(h), M, U: D) has no explanation. 
Thus, if Consistency lies in complexity class C, then Relevance is also in C and 
Necessity is in co-C. 
Our first result shows that abduction from default theories based on credulous ex- 
planations can be efficiently reduced to deductive reasoning from propositional default 
theories. This is somewhat unexpected and surprising, since in case of classical theories, 
abduction cannot be efficiently reduced to deduction. 
Given a PDAP P = (H, M, W D), we construct a default theory Tp = (Wp, Dp) such 
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where for each h E H, ah is a new propositional atom. Informally, the atom ah means 
that hypothesis h is adopted. Each credulous explanation E of P is verified by a 
consistent extension A of (W U E, D) that contains M. This extension A gives rise to a 
consistent default extension A’ of Tp which augments A be new formulas. The default 
y prevents an augmentation of an extension A which does not contain M, while the 
defaults 2, z serve to choose the explanation E, where 2 (respectively s) is 
applied to include h in E (respectively exclude h from E). Note that using the defaults 
x7 -h 
:I1 ~ instead of ~, ~ does not work; in particular, applying 3 would mean to 
include the negation ‘of h in E, which is different from excluding h from E. 
More formally, the construction has the following property: 
Theorem 4.4. Let P = (H, M, W, D) be a PDAP. Then, 
(i) if E is a credulous explanation for P, then there exists a consistent extension A’ 
of Tp such that E = {h E H 1 a,, E A’}; 
(ii) if A’ is a consistent extension of Tp, then E = {h E H 1 ah E A’} is a credulous 
explanation for P. 
Proof. (i) Let E be a credulous explanation for P. Hence, (W U E, D) has a consistent 
extension A which contains M. Define A’ = Th(A U {ah 1 h E E} U {lab 1 h E H\E}). 
Clearly, A’ is consistent. Moreover, A’ is an extension of (Wp, Dp). Indeed, each 
default d E D that can be applied in At from the sequence Ao, Al,. . . for A can also 
be applied in Ai from Ah, A{, . . . . On the other hand, if d E D is applied in some A[, 
then it is also applied in some Aj. Since M & A’, no default y can be applied. Thus, 
A’ = Ui”, A{, and hence A’ is an extension of (Wp, Dp). Obviously, E = {h 1 ah E A’}. 
This proves (i) . 
(ii) Let A’ be a consistent extension of (Wp, Dp), and let E = {h ) ah E A’}. Let A 
be the restriction of A’ to the language of P. Then, A is an extension of (W U E, D). 
Indeed, first notice that E C A. Each default d E D which is applicable in A( from 
A;, A;, . . . is also applicable in Ai from Ao, Al,. . . . On the other hand, each d E D 
which is applicable in Ai can be clearly applied in Ai+] as well. We conclude that 
A = Ui”, Ai, and hence A is an extension of (W U E, D). We show that M 2 A, by 
which (ii) is proven. But this is easy: M C A’, for otherwise a default y would be 
applicable; hence, by definition of A, M 2 A. Cl 
Using (i) and (ii), the main decisional abductive reasoning tasks can be efficiently 
transformed to similar deductive reasoning tasks in default logic. 
Corollary 4.5. Let P be a PDAP based on credulous explanations. Then, (i) Consis- 
tency, (ii) Relevance, and (iii) Necessity are equivalent to (i*) existence of a consistent 
extension of Tp, (ii*) membership of ah in some consistent extension of Tp , and (iii* ) 
membership of ah in ali extensions of Tp, respectively. 
By the results on the complexity of propositional default logic [ 27,591, it follows 
that (i) and (ii) are in ZI and that (iii) is in II;. We also obtain matching hardness by 
reductions from deductive default reasoning. Let T = (Wr D) be a normal default theory 
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such that W is a consistent set of literals (in fact, W can be even empty), and 4 a 
formula. Let h, q be new propositional atoms. Then, the following facts are clear: the 
PDAP 
(1) 
has a credulous explanation iff T I-, 4; h is relevant for the PDAP 
l(h), {qh Wu (4 2 q)yD) (2) 
iff T t-‘c 4; and h is necessary for the PDAP 
l(h), {qh W u (4 v h 3 q)?D) (3) 
iff T Ifc 4. Since the reasoning problems for T in ( l), (2) are ZF-hard and the one in 
(3) is @-hard [ 271, we obtain the following results. 
Theorem 4.6. Let P be a PDAP based on credulous explanations. The problem (i) 
Consistency is IS;-complete, (ii) Relevance is Zg-complete and (iii) Necessity is IIF- 
complete, with hardness even for normal P. 
Remark. The complexity result for Consistency shows that a polynomial time reduction 
of credulous explanations to classical extensions of a default theory Tp as above, but 
where the default theory is normal, is not possible in general. Indeed, if Wp is consistent, 
then Tp has a consistent extension, and thus the PDAP would also have an explanation. 
This would imply an NP algorithm deciding existence of a credulous explanation, and 
NP = C! would follow, which is generally believed to be false. 
It is interesting to note that verifying a credulous explanation is as hard as finding 
one. The former problem can be easily reduced to the latter; moreover, 8 is the only 
possible credulous explanation for the PDAP (1). Thus, 
Theorem 4.7. Let P = (H, h4, W, D) be a PDAP. Deciding if E & H is a credulous 
explanation for P is X:-complete, with hardness holding even for normal P. 
Now consider abduction based on skeptical reasoning. It would be useful to have 
a reduction of abductive reasoning to deductive reasoning which can be computed 
efficiently. However, by using skeptical reasoning the abductive reasoning tasks grow 
more complex, by one level of the polynomial hierarchy. This strongly suggests that 
such an efficient reduction is not possible. 
We first consider the problem of recognizing skeptical explanations. Clearly, this 
reduces to deciding if a certain default theory has a consistent extension (which is in 
Xi) and if each extension includes all manifestations (II!). Thus, the problem is a 
logical conjunction of a problem in Z; and a problem in II;, and hence in the class Dg. 
Moreover, it is also hard for this class. 
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Theorem 4.8. Let P = (H, M, W, D) be a PDAP. Deciding if E c H is a skeptical 
explanation for P is D!-complete. 5 
Thus, as in the case of credulous explanations, recognizing a skeptical explanation is 
at the second level of the polynomial hierarchy. However, since this problem involves 
both a Z!- and a @-hard subtask (as opposed to only a Z!-hard one), finding a 
skeptical explanation resides at the third level. 
Theorem 4.9. Let P be a PDAP based on skeptical explanations. The problem (i) 
Consistency is Z!-complete, (ii) Relevance is C!-complete and (iii) Necessity is II!- 
complete, with hardness even for normal P. 
How does this result compare to other nonmonotonic logics, in particular, which non- 
monotonic logic has similar complexity? We know that Konolige’s moderately grounded 
autoepistemic logic [ 361 and several other ground nonmonotonic modal logics have the 
same complexity [ 19,211; thus, we can use a theorem prover for such logics to perform 
abductive reasoning from default theories based on skeptical explanations. 
4.2. Minimal explanations 
As mentioned above, one is usually interested in minimal explanations for observa- 
tions. The results in [22] were that the complexity of abduction from classical theories 
does not increase if minimal explanations are used instead of arbitrary explanations. 
However, this is not true for abduction from default logic. Here, checking minimality 
of an explanation is a source of complexity, which causes an increase in complexity by 
one level of the polynomial hierarchy. 
Consider first credulous explanations. Checking minimality of an explanation E has 
complementary complexity of checking the explanation property. 
Theorem 4.10. Let P = (H, M, W, D) be a PDAP. Deciding if a credulous explanation 
E for P is minimal is II:-complete, with hardness even for normal P. 6 
To see this, notice that E is not minimal iff for some h E E, the PDAP (E\(h), M, W 
D) has a credulous explanation; hence, it follows that the problem is in II;. On the other 
hand, reconsider the PDAP (3). Clearly, {h} is a credulous explanation; moreover, it is 
minimal iff h is necessary for P. Thus, @-hardness follows. 
Note that recognizing minimal credulous explanations, which consists in checking the 
explanation property and testing minimality, is in D!; it is also complete for this class 
(Theorem A.l). Thus, this problem can be transformed into recognition of skeptical 
explanations for a certain PDAP and vice versa. 
5 For normal PDAPs, the problem is “only” fl:-complete, since then deciding whether (W U E, D) has a 
consistent extension is in NP. 
s Strictly speaking, it is “promised” that E is an explanation; in fact, since recognizing explanations is 
D!-complete, already recognizing correct instances would be harder than ffi, unless II! = D!. However, the 
result holds also on deciding given any E, whether no E’ C E is a credulous explanation. 
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Due to the complexity of minimality checking, Relevance migrates to the next level 
of the polynomial hierarchy. 
Theorem 4.11. Let Q be a PDAP based on minimal credulous explanations. Then, 
Relevance is XT-complete, and hardness holds even for normal Q. 
Now let us consider minimal skeptical explanations. Testing minimality of a skeptical 
explanation is much more involved than of a credulous explanation. While the latter has 
roughly the same complexity as testing the explanation property, the former is harder by 
one level of the polynomial hierarchy. Intuitively, this can be explained as follows. Since 
verifying a credulous explanation E is in Z!, it has a polynomial size “proof’ which 
can be checked with an NP oracle in polynomial time. Thus, if we ask for a smaller 
explanation E’ c E, we can simultaneously guess E’ and its proof, and check the proof 
in polynomial time with the NP oracle. However, verifying a skeptical explanation E is 
II;-hard, and hence E does not have such a “proof’. Here, verification needs the full 
power of a II2p oracle. 
Theorem 4.12. Let Q = (H, M, W; D) be a PDAP. Deciding if a skeptical explanation 
E for Q is minimal is IIF-complete, with hardness holding even for normal Q. 7 
Note that recognizing minimal skeptical explanations is in II& since the complexity of 
deciding minimality (II!) dominates the complexity of the explanation property (“only” 
D!), and is also complete for this class (see Theorem A.2). 
The complexity of deciding relevance of a hypothesis increases by the same amount as 
testing minimality if skeptical explanations are used instead of credulous explanations. 
In fact, the problem resides at the fourth level of the polynomial hierarchy. 
Theorem 4.13. Let Q be a PDAP based on minimal skeptical explanations. Then, 
problem Relevance is X:-complete, with hardness even for normal Q. 
There is no well-known nonmonotonic logic that has similar complexity, and thus one 
cannot take advantage of theorem provers for such logics to perform skeptical abduction 
from default theories. 
5. Tractable cases 
From the practical side, the results of the previous section are discouraging, since 
abduction from default theories has even higher complexity than deduction, in particular 
for skeptical explanations. As a consequence, an implementation that works efficiently 
on all inputs is not possible. But this does not mean that it is impossible to come up 
with solutions that work in practice. Several methods to cope with NP-hard problems are 
7 Note that here, as opposed to checking minimality of credulous explanations, recognizing correct problem 
instances (D!) is not harder than deciding the minimality (cf. footnote 6). 
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known [9,41], among which the following two are most popular: identifying (natural) 
problem restrictions that guarantee tractability and approximation methods. 
Concerning approximation, two directions are viable. One is to find a notion of 
approximate inference that reduces complexity, in the spirit of [ 10,551. The other is to 
use heuristic algorithms that work well in practice; in case of the classical satisfiability 
problem, the greedy algorithm (GSAT) [ 571 has proven to be a valuable method for 
solving moderately sized instances efficiently. However, GSAT and similar algorithms 
are designed for problems that are in NP; it is not known how to apply GSAT in order 
to solve problems that are hard for Zg or II! efficiently. In general, little is known about 
approximation of problems in the polynomial hierarchy, as well as PSPACE-complete 
problems [ 141. 
For fragments of default logic from which the abductive reasoning tasks are in NP, 
GSAT is applicable. An example is credulous abduction from default theories where all 
propositional formulas are from a tractable fragment of the propositional language, e.g. 
Horn formulas or Krom formulas (conjunctions of clauses with at most two literals). 
In such a case, classical inference k vanishes as source of complexity. In particular, the 
2!-complete abductive reasoning tasks fall back to NP. Therefore, after a polynomial 
time transformation of the reasoning task to the classical satisfiability problem, we can 
apply GSAT to solve the reasoning tasks efficiently. 
Identifying tractable cases in terms of suitable restrictions on the input is the “classi- 
cal” way of tackling a hard problem. This approach requires that all sources of complex- 
ity are dried up; default abduction suffers from up to four such sources. In particular, 
the underlying default reasoning tasks (which embody the complexity of classical in- 
ference and the number of extensions) must be tractable. The excellent work of Kautz 
and Selman [35] and Stillman [58] gives a very detailed picture of polynomial versus 
intractable cases of default reasoning. The following two classes of default theories 
(W, D) are among the many fragments of default logic they considered: 
l Literal-Horn [35]: W is a set of literals and each default in D is Horn, i.e., of 
form “A’~~Aat’e, where the ai are atoms and C is a literal. 
l Krom-pf-normal [58]: W is a set of Krom formulas, and each default in D is of 
form &L@& where all Ci are literals. P,A...Aek 9
For those classes, tractability of credulous inference (Wr D) I-, !’ for a single literal 
e’ was shown. In fact, these classes are the maximal classes in the hierarchy of default 
classes for which this inference task is tractable, cf. [ 581. Note that literal-Horn theories 
include factual knowledge bases, extended by simple default rules; however, they allow 
to express e.g. the close world assumption (CWA), or rules so that their application 
does not lead to inconsistency. 
Based on generalizations of the quoted results, we obtain some tractable cases of 
credulous default abduction. Similar tractability results for skeptical default abduction are 
unlikely, since the underlying skeptical inference (K D) l-s e is co-NP-complete in both 
cases (for literal-Horn, cf. [ 35, Theorem 7.31; for Krom-pf-normal, see Proposition B.3 
in Appendix B). 
The following lemma generalizes [ 35, Theorem 6.51, which is formulated for a single 
literal e rather than a conjunction el A. . . A &, of literals (see Appendix B for the proof). 
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Lemma 5.1. Let (W D) be a Literal-Horn default theory, and let [I,. . . , &, be literals. 
Then, deciding ( W, D) kc et A. . . A k,,, is possible in 0( m . n) time, where n is the length 
of the input. 
This result is established by reducing (W D) t, !I A . . . A C,, apart from the trivial 
cases where W or et A . . . A &, is not consistent, to a classical inference problem H t 
e, A-. A e, where H is a Horn theory that is linear time constructible (see the proof 
in Appendix B) ; applying standard linear time algorithms for Horn satisfiability (e.g. 
unit resolution [ 401)) H k CL can be decided in linear time, and thus H k !l A . . . A e,,, 
is decidable in 0( m . n) time. ’ Thus, we obtain the lemma. 
For Krom-pf-normal, an analogous generalization is not evident; indeed, the problem 
(WD) t, e, A... A !, is NP-hard (see Proposition B.l in Appendix B). However, a 
generalization is possible if the conjunction is small. In what follows, we call a set L 
of literals small iff IL/ < b for some fixed constant b. 
Lemma 5.2. Let (W D) be Krom-pf-normal, and let L = {f?, , . . . , &} be a small set of 
literals. Then, deciding (W D) I-, Cl A . . . A & is possible in 0( 1 Dlb . n) time, i.e., in 
polynomial time. 
For convenience, we introduce some additional notation for the rest of this section. 
For any literal 4, we denote by N e the literal opposite to e, i.e., N e = x if C = lx, and 
Ne=xife=lx. 
5.1. Credulous abduction from literal-Horn default theories 
For this class, the main abductive reasoning tasks are tractable. 
Theorem 5.3. Let P = (H, M, W D) be a PDAP based on credulous explanations, such 
that (W D) is literal-Horn. Then, Consistency, Relevance, and Necessity can be solved 
in 0( IMI . n) time, where n is the length of P. 
Proof. Construct a literal-Horn Tl = (W Dl), where 
DI = 
bh : h : Tb,, : bh 
---1h~H 
h ’ Tb/, ’ b/, 
where each bh is a new propositional atom. It is not hard to see that P has an explanation 
iff W is consistent and Tl I-, ml A . . . A mk, where M = {ml,. . . , mk). Tl can be 
constructed in O(n) time, and by Lemma 5.1, Tl kc ml A . . . A mk can be decided in 
0( IM] .n) time. Hence, Consistency can be decided in 0( IMI .n) time. By Corollary 4.3, 
Relevance and Necessity can be easily reduced (in fact, in linear time) to Consistency 
respectively its complement. Thus, they are also solvable in 0( IM] . n) time. 0 
* This is even possible in 0( (m- + 1) . n) time, where m- is the number of negative literals 6’; (cf. proof of 
Lemma 5.1); however, to our knowledge, no O(n), i.e., linear time algorithm is known. The bounds for the 
polynomial time results in Section 5.1 can be sharpened accordingly, by replacing “IM(” with “iA4-1 + I”, 
where M- is the set of negative literals in M. 
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Algorithm LH-Cred-Explanation( H, M, W, D) ; 
Input: A propositional literal-Horn DAP P = (H, M, W 0). 
Output: A credulous explanation E for P, if one exists. 
begin 
for each I E W do if N e E W then stop; (* W inconsistent; no explanation *) 
for each C E M do if N e E M then stop; (* M inconsistent; no explanation *) 
4 := conjunction of all literals in M; 
construct Tl = (W, Dl) from P; (* P has an explanation iff Tl t--c # *) 
construct Horn theory H s.t. H I- #J iff Tl t-, I$; (* proof of Lemma 5.1 *) 
if H Ij qb then stop; (* no explanation exists *) 
M := {x 1 atom x, HI- x}; (* M is the least model of H *) 
C:=WuMu{~x~(a:~x/~x)EDl, Mkoa, Mpx}; 
E := {h E H / h E C, bh E C}; (* E is an explanation *) 
output(E) ; 
end LH-Cred-Explanation. 
Fig. 4. Algorithm for finding a credulous explanation (literal-Horn). 
Notice that a polynomial algorithm for j&ding an explanation (even containing a 
given hypothesis), can be extracted from the proof of Theorem 5.3 and Lemma 5.1, 
which is outlined in Fig. 4. 
Each step of the algorithm can be done in O(n) time, except the test H I- q5, which is 
possible in 0( [MI .n) time; hence, the total running time is O( IMI .n). The algorithm can 
also be used to solve Relevance and Necessiry, utilizing Corollary 4.3, in 0( IMI .n) time. 
Moreover, even a minimal credulous explanation can be found in polynomial time. 
Indeed, it is easy to see that an explanation E for a PDAP P = (H, M, W D) is minimal 
if and only if (E\(h), M, W D) h as no explanation for each h E E. Thus, given an 
explanation E for P as above, one can find a minimal one by trying to subsequently 
eliminate hypotheses from E, as done in the algorithm in Fig. 5. Thus, we obtain the 
following result. 
Theorem 5.4. Let P = (H, M, W D) be a PDAP where (W D) is Literal-Horn. Then, a 
minimal credulous explanation for P can be found in 0( I HI . IMI . n) time, where n is 
the length of P. 
However, Relevance based on minimal credulous explanations for PDAPs with literal- 
Horn default theories can be shown to be NP-complete (Proposition B.4). Recall that 
necessity of a hypothesis h in minimal explanations coincides with necessity of h in 
arbitrary explanations (Proposition 4.1), and thus also Necessity is polynomial. 
5.2. Credulous abduction from Krom-pf-normal default theories 
Tractability of credulous inference of a literal from a Krom-pf-normal theory allows 
us to obtain another tractable fragment of abduction from default theories. 
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Algorithm LH-Min-Cred-Explanation( H, M, W D) ; 
Input: A propositional literal-Horn DAP P = (H, M, W D). 
Output: A minimal credulous explanation E for P, if one exists. 
begin E := LH-Cred-Explanation( H, M, W 0); 
if E is undefined then stop else R := E; (* try to remove each h E R from E *) 
while R # 8 do 
begin select h E R; (* try to remove h from E *) 
E 1 := LH-Cred-Explanation( E\{ h}, M, W D) ; 
if El is undefined then R := R\(h) (* h is in all explanations E’ G E *) 
else begin E := El; R := E; end; (* take the smaller explanation El *) 
end; 
output ( E) ; 
end LH-Min-Cred-Explanation. 
Fig. 5. Algorithm for finding a minimal credulous explanation (literal-Horn) 
The following lemma on inference of a literal from a Krom theory augmented by 
literals is important for credulous inference of a set of literals from a Krom-pf-normal 
default theory. 
Lemma 5.5. Let S be a (propositional) Krom theory and I? a literal, and let L = 
(4,. . . , &} be a set of literals such that (i) S U L is consistent, (ii) S U L t I and 
S I+ C. Then, S u {&} t- f? for some et E L. 
From the lemma, we obtain the following criterion for credulous inference of a literal. 
For convenience, let for each default d = $$$j denote lit(d) = {e,, . . . , lk}, and let 
for each set D of such defaults denote lit(D) = UdED lit(d). 
Proposition 5.6. Let T = (W D) be a Krom-pf-normal default theory and let L = 
(4,. . . , &,} be a set of literals. Let Ll = {ei E L 1 W y t$}. Then, T t, C1 A . . . A &, iff 
(a) Ll is empty, or 
(b) there exists a subset Dl 2 D such that 
(1) ID11 6 ILlI, 
(2) W U lit( Dl) is consistent, and 
(3) WUlit(D1) k&foreach eG Ll. 
Based on this proposition, the algorithm in Fig. 6 decides whether a conjunction of 
literals is a credulous consequence of a Krom-pf-normal default theory. The analysis of 
its running time yields the following result. 
Theorem 5.7. Let T = (W D) be a Krom-pf-normal default theory, and let L = 
(4,. . . , &,} be a set of literals. Then, T 1, f?, A . f . A &,, can be decided using 
Krom-PFN-Cred-Inf in 0( 1 D I”’ . m . n) time, where n is the length of the input. 
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Algorithm Krom-PFN-Cred-Inf( W; D, 4) ; 
Input: A propositional Krom-pf-normal default theory (K D), 
a conjunction of literals C#J = gi A + . . A l,. 
Output: “Yes” if (W D) I-, 4, “No” otherwise. 
begin Ll := {& 1 W y f$, 1 < i < m}; 
if Ll = 0 then output( “Yes”) (* W t- 4; thus 4 is in any extension *) 
else for each Dl &D s.t. ID11 6 ILlI do 
begin S := W U lit(D1); (* lit(D1) = all literals in Dl; S is Krom *) 
ifSy_LandSt-&forall&ELl (*m+l X lineartime*) 
then begin output ( “Yes”) ; stop; end; 
end; 
output ( “No”) ; 
end Krom-PFN-Cred-Inf. 
Fig. 6. Algorithm for credulous inference of a conjunction of literals (Krom-pf-normal) 
Thus, in particular, if L = {[I,. . . , &} is small, we obtain a polynomial bound 0( 1 Dlk. 
n); this proves Lemma 5.2 at the beginning of this section. Recall that tractability of 
credulous literal inference can most likely not be generalized to an arbitrary conjunction 
of literals, since this problem is NP-complete (Proposition B.1). 
By a reduction to credulous default reasoning, one can show that credulous abduction 
from a Krom-pf-normal default theory is polynomial if the set of manifestations is small. 
Theorem 5.8. Let P = (H, M, W D) be a PDAP based on credulous explanations 
such thatM={e,,...,&} is small and (W D) is Krom-pf-normal. Then, Consistency, 
Relevance, and Necessity can be solved in 0( lDlb. n) time, where n is the length of P. 
Unfortunately, Theorem 5.8 cannot be generalized to an arbitrary set M of literals. In 
fact, due to the NP-hardness of (K D) k--c et A . . . A C,, for Krom-pf-normal (K D), the 
problem is clearly NP-hard. 
Like in the case of literal-Horn default theories, a polynomial time algorithm for 
finding a credulous explanation can be extracted from the proof. As shown below, there 
are efficient and simple algorithms for finding all minimal credulous explanations of a 
such a PDAP. Thus, we do not further elaborate on this point. 
Interestingly, the number of hypotheses in a minimal credulous explanation is bounded 
by the number of manifestations. Intuitively, this is explained by the fact that a mani- 
festation can always be explained by a single hypothesis. 
Proposition 5.9. Let E be any minimal credulous explanation for a PDAP P = 
(H, M, W D) where (W D) is K rom-pf-normal and M is jnite. Then, IEl < [MI. 
In particular, for a single manifestation (M = {a}), the minimal explanations consist 
of single hypotheses, if hypotheses are needed at all for an explanation. A consequence 
of this characterization is that all minimal credulous explanations can be computed by 
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Algorithm All-KPFN-Min-Cred-Exp( H, M, W 0) ; 
Input: A propositional Krom-pf-normal DAP P = (H, M, W; D). 
Output: All minimal credulous explanations E for P. 
begin 4 := conjunction of all literals in M; Min_Expl := 0; 
if W k I or 4 k I then stop; (* 2 X linear time; no explanation exists *) 
for i := 0 to IMI do 
for each E C H st. /El = i do 
if W U E y J- and E’ $ Min_Expl, for every E’ c E then 
if Krom-PFN-Cred-Inf( W U E, D, 4) = “Yes” then 
begin output(E) ; 
Min_Expl := Min.Expl U {E}; 
end; 
end All-KPFN-Min-Cred-Exp. 
Fig. 7. Algorithm for finding all minimal credulous explanations (Krom-pf-normal). 
testing all subsets E & H with IE( 6 IMI time, which is done by the algorithm in Fig. 7. 
The correctness of the algorithm follows from Proposition 5.9 and the correctness of 
Krom-PFN-C&-Inf. If the set of manifestations M is small, then the algorithm runs 
in polynomial time, which is captured by the next theorem. 
Theorem 5.10. Given a PDAP P = (H, M, W D) where (W D) is Krom-pf-normal 
and M is small, all minimal credulous explanations for P can be computed in time 
0( lHlb. lDlb. n), where n is the length of P. 
(Standard search data structures are used to represent MinXxpl.) As a consequence, 
also Relevance and Necessity for minimal explanations are polynomial if M is small. 
6. Complexity of the first-order case 
In the previous sections, we considered the computational cost of abduction from 
propositional DAPs. However, for knowledge representation in practice, a language 
allowing for predicates is more relevant and realistic, as in the examples we considered 
above. 
Since default logic subsumes first-order logic, default reasoning based on unrestricted 
first-order logic is undecidable in general; in fact, as shown already by Reiter, the 
credulous consequences are even not recursively enumerable [ 521. Hence, also abduction 
from default logic is highly undecidable in general. 
However, default logic is decidable in the common setting of the domain closure 
axiom (Vx. x = ci V . . . V x = c,) and the unique names assumption ( AiCj ci # 
cj), where the language is function free. In the following, we implicitly assume this 
setting for first-order default logic; notice that this was intuitive for the examples we 
considered. 
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In this setting, an existential quantifier 3x. 4(x) is equivalent to r$( ct ) V. . . V &c,), 
and a universal quantifier Vx. $(x) to $( cl > A . . . A fi ( c, ) . Therefore, every first-order 
formula can be rewritten to a quantifier-free formula, which, however, is in general 
exponentially larger. Each default rule d with free variables x = xt , . . . , xm gives rise to 
an exponential number (n”) of ground defaults. As a consequence, a first-order default 
theory T = (w D) reduces to an equivalent propositional default theory T” = (W”, D*) 
that can be exponentially larger. 
Intuitively, this means that the complexity of first-order default reasoning is (at most) 
exponentially higher than the complexity of propositional default reasoning (C!) . The 
appropriate class for such complexity is the exponential analogue of Z! = tip, which 
is the class ZF = NEXPNP i.e. nondeterministic exponentiaE time (0( 2~“~“)) > rather 
than polynomial time (O(d( n) > > with an oracle for NP (“exponential” comes in by 
the reduction of T to T*, after which the algorithms for propositional DAPs can be 
applied). 
In fact, it is shown in [29] that credulous first-order default reasoning is complete 
for ZF; as a simple consequence, skeptical reasoning is complete for IIF = CO-Z:. The 
proof in [29] establishes that these results hold even if W is a universal theory and no 
quantifiers occur in D. Moreover, like in the propositional case, they hold if in addition 
the default theory is normal and W is a consistent set of literals (this is immediate from 
[ 291 and results in [ 81). 
The polynomial time transformations of default reasoning to the main credulous de- 
fault abduction tasks in (l)-(3) established the hardness parts of Theorem 4.6. Clearly, 
these transformations also work for first-order theories. Therefore, from the complexity 
results for first-order default reasoning, it follows that Consistency and Relevance are 
x:-hard and Necessity is @-hard for credulous default abduction in the first-order case. 
On the other hand, it is clear from the above discussion that any first-order DAP P 
can be reduced in exponential time to an equivalent propositional DAP P*; as a conse- 
quence, the main credulous first-order default abduction problems belong to the classes 
Zt and II!, respectively. Thus, we arrive at the following result. 
Theorem 6.1. Let P be a$rst-order DAP under the domain closure axiom and unique 
names assumption, based on credulous explanations. Then (i) Consistency is I$:- 
complete, (ii) Relevance is X:-complete, and (iii) Necessity is @-complete. 
Analogous results follow for recognizing a credulous explanation and checking min- 
imality of a credulous explanation. Thus, the complexity of credulous abduction is 
exponentially higher in the first-order case than in the propositional context. Note 
that this definitely proves intractability, even if P = NP would be true. Indeed, EX- 
PTIME, i.e., the class of all problems that can be decided in exponential time, is 
included in CF and II:, and so all EXPTIME-complete problems. Those problems 
have provably exponential running time, which implies that every problem that is 
complete for ZF or IIF has provably an exponential lower bound on its running 
time. 
For skeptical first-order abduction and minimal explanations, an analogous exponential 
increase in complexity (from ZJ: to ZF, II: to II:, etc.) strongly suggests itself. From 
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the discussion above, it is clear that for each problem, the exponential analogue is an 
upper complexity bound. Matching hardness results can be obtained by applying the 
results on evaluating second-order predicate formulas over finite structures in [ 291 (see 
end of Appendix A for more details). 
We close this section with some remarks on tractable first-order default abduction. 
Like the intractability results, also the polynomial time results in Section 5 scale up from 
the propositional case. A-quite moderate-extension of propositional literal-Horn and 
Krom-pf-normal default theories (R D) to the first-order case is to allow also universally 
quantified Krom clauses (respectively literals) besides propositional (ground) clauses 
(respectively literals) in W, and to allow also nonground literals fJ( X) in defaults 
besides ground literals. Unfortunately, reducing a first-order DAP P to the equivalent 
propositional DAP P*, on which the polynomial time algorithms in Section 5 can 
be applied, does not give a polynomial algorithm, since the reduction is exponential. 
However, no substantially better algorithms are available, since even under this restrictive 
setting, abduction is intractable. 
To substantiate this claim, we first consider the class of first-order literal-Horn default 
theories. It is easy to see that logic programs without negations (i.e., datalog programs) 
are a fragment of this class. Indeed, each program rule A0 +- Al,. . . , A,,, where the 
Ai are atoms, can be equivalently represented by the Horn default A+;;A,,:Ao. As a 
consequence, credulous as well as skeptical deductive inference from a default theory 
of this form is EXPTIME-hard, since inference of a fact from a datalog program is 
known to be EXPTIME-hard (this is implicit in the work of [ 11,611 and part of the 
folklore now). Based on this, it is easily established that the main credulous abduction 
tasks from a first-order literal-Horn default theory are EXPTIME -complete problems. 
Again, this definitely proves intractability, since no polynomial time algorithms for such 
problems are possible. 
Similarly, also abduction from Krom-pf-normal default theories is intractable in the 
first-order case. In fact, one can show that credulous inference of a single literal from 
such a default theory is NP-hard, even for instances of simple form (see Proposition B.5 
in Appendix B) . Therefore, also credulous abduction is NP-hard (respectively co-NP- 
hard), even if only a single manifestation has to be explained. 
Tractability as in the propositional case can be gained, however, for both classes 
by imposing a constant upper bound on the arity of predicates; this guarantees that 
a first-order DAP P reduces to P* in polynomial time. Thus, by applying the poly- 
nomial algorithms from Section 5 on P* afterwards, we have a polynomial overall 
algorithm. 
7. Conclusion and further research 
We have investigated abduction from default theories. Starting from motivating ex- 
amples, we looked how abduction can be reasonably performed; this led us to a basic 
model of abduction from default theories. The two inference modalities of classical 
default reasoning, credulous and skeptical inference, give rise to two credulous and 
skeptical abduction; both are useful in practice. Credulous abduction appears to be 
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useful e.g. for diagnosis, while skeptical abduction is appealing for planning. This cor- 
responds to previous applications of abduction in diagnosis (cf. [ 44,461) and planning 
and plan recognition (cf. [ 24,421) . 
Moreover, we have analyzed the computational complexity of the abduction model, 
both in the propositional as well as in the predicate case. The main results on the 
complexity of abduction from propositional default theories are summarized in Table 1. 
They are discouraging from the practical point, since they show that the main reasoning 
tasks are highly intractable, and hence polynomial time algorithms are unrealistic. In 
fact, the complexity ranges from the second level of the polynomial hierarchy (2;, 
II;), which is the level of deductive default reasoning and abduction from classical 
theories, up to fourth level (XI), the “square” of the complexity of default reasoning. 
Interestingly, credulous abduction is less complex than skeptical abduction, by one 
level in the polynomial hierarchy; thus, abductive default diagnosis is less complex 
than abductive default planning. A somewhat positive finding is that the least complex 
variant, credulous default abduction, can be shortly transformed into classical default 
reasoning, and thus theorem provers like the DeReS system [ 131 can be efficiently 
used to perform abduction. However, this property is lost as soon as one uses minimal 
explanations, which are more complex. 
In the first-order case, under some common restrictions (in full first-order logic, all 
abduction problems are trivially undecidable) the complexity scales up by an exponential 
factor, and is provably intractable. 
Exploring the tractability frontier, we have also shown that credulous abduction from 
the previously known classes of propositional literal-Horn and Krom-pf-normal default 
theories [35,58] is tractable. Unfortunately, these results do not carry over to the first- 
order case. 
Several issues remain for future work. One is to find more applications for abduction 
from default theories, and to see how credulous and skeptical abduction apply therefore. 
It would also be interesting to see whether other modes of abduction, besides credulous 
and skeptical abduction, are relevant. 
Further issues more on the foundational side are other concepts of abductive explana- 
tion, as well variants of classical default logic for the underlying theory. In the present 
paper, we focused on the most simple concepts of abduction explanation that have been 
considered in the literature. A number of different notions of acceptable explanations 
exist, cf. [ 7,22,43,48], which are based on a preference between explanations; how- 
ever, all single out minimal explanations. Most well known are explanations that have 
minimal size (cf. [ 431) and explanations that have minimal cost (or weight respectively 
probability [47,48] ). Results for abduction from classical theories [ 221 suggest that 
abduction from default theories using explanations of smallest size or smallest cost yield 
problems complete for classes AL and AL[O(logn)] of the (refined) polynomial hier- 
archy [ 3 I 1. In particular, these concepts are not strong enough to lower the complexity 
of default abduction. 
On the other hand, several variants and extensions of Reiter’s default logic have 
been introduced, motivated by some weaknesses of the original approach, e.g., [4, 
5,26,39,491. It would be interesting to investigate how abduction behaves on these 
formalisms. In particular, stationary default logic [4,49] would be interesting, since 
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there the complexity of skeptical reasoning is lower than in classical default logic [ 281; 
as a consequence, also skeptical abduction has lower complexity. 
Also on the algorithmic side, interesting issues remain for further work. One important 
is, of course, to find other fragments of default logic on which abduction is tractable. In 
particular, fragments that are not within a propositional language would be interesting. 
Apart from that, approximation methods that allow more efficient abductive default rea- 
soning are needed, either on a semantical basis, cf. [ 10,54,55] or on a computational 
approach [ 571. Anyway, the results about tractability make clear that good approxi- 
mation algorithms are needed. Note that quite a bit is known about approximation of 
probabilistic inference problems [ 17,541 as well as # P-complete problems [60] (see 
also [ 311). However, not much is known about approximation of problems complete 
for classes of the polynomial hierarchy above NP and for PSPACE-complete problems, 
cf. [14]. 
Finally, it would be worthwhile to thoroughly investigate abduction from theories 
in knowledge representation formalisms different from default logic. In the context 
of logic programming, the study and use of abduction is meanwhile established, cf. 
[ 331. Complexity results for abductive logic programming [23] that are similar to 
those for abduction from default theories support the view of the intimate relationship 
between these formalisms. Similar results for other closely related formalisms such as 
autoepistemic logic are plausible. 
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Appendix A. Proofs of general case complexity 
The classes of the polynomial hierarchy have problems complete under polynomial 
time transformations involving quantified Boolean formulas (QBFs), which we will 
refer to in many proofs. A QBF is an expression of the form 
QIXIQZXZ.. .Q/&.E, k b 1, (A.1) 
where E is a Boolean expression whose (propositional) variables are from pairwise 
disjoint nonempty sets of variables XI,. . . , Xk, and the Qi are alternating quantifiers 
from (3, V}, for all i = 1,. . . , k. If Qt = 3 then we say the QBF is k-existential, 
otherwise it is k-universal. Validity of QBFs is defined in the obvious way by recursion 
to variable-free Boolean expressions. We denote by QBFk,g (respectively, QBFk,v) the 
set of all valid k-existential (respectively, k-universal) QBFs. 
Deciding, given a k-existential QBF @ (respectively a k-universal QBF W) , whether 
@ E QBFk,g (respectively p E QBFk,v), is a classical ZF-complete (respectively III- 
complete) problem; deciding the conjunction (@ E QBFk,g ) A (p E QBFk,v) is complete 
for Di. 
Z Eirer et al. /Artificial Intelligence 90 (I 997) 177-223 207 
We introduce some additional notation. For a set A of propositional atoms, we denote 
by -A the set {la ( a E A} and by A’ the set of atoms {a’ 1 a E A}. Moreover, 
for a Boolean formula F and a set Xl 2 X of atoms, we denote by F:, the formula 
obtained from F by replacing each occurrence of an atom x E X1 in F by true and each 
occurrence of an ato& x E X\Xl by false; as X will be understood, we write simply 
Theorem 4.8. Let P = (H, M, W, D) be a 
explanation for P is Dz-complete. 
PDAP. Deciding if E C H is a skeptical 
Proof. As already argued, the problem is in D;. To show hardness, we reduce deciding 
whether, given two propositional default theories Tl = (Wl, Dl) and T2 = (W2, D2), it 
holds that Tl has a consistent extension and T2 t--s x to the problem; since the problems 
are xi-hard and @-hard [ 271, respectively, this will clearly prove Di-hardness. Without 
loss of generality, Tl and T2 have different propositional atoms, x does not occur in 
Tl, and W2 = 0 (thus T2 has only consistent extensions), cf. [27]. Define P = 
(8, {x}, Wl U W2, D 1 U 02). It is easily seen that 8 is a skeptical explanation of P iff 
Tl has a consistent extension and T2 1, nc; this proves the result. q 
Theorem 4.9. Let P be a PDAP based on skeptical explanations. The problem (i) 
Consistency is Z!-complete, (ii) Relevance is Z!-complete and (iii) Necessity is IIF- 
complete, with hardness even for normal P. 
Proof. Membership. A guess E for a skeptical explanation for P can be verified by 
two calls to 2; oracle, by checking whether (W U E, D) has a consistent extension and 
whether (W U E, D) t--s 4, where 4 is the conjunction of all formulas in M. Hence, it 
is easy to see that (i), (ii), and the complement of (iii) are in XT. 
Hardness. (i) We describe here a transformation of deciding if a QBF @ = 3XVY3Z. F 
is valid. Define 
W={f ++F}, D= C 
where f is a new atom, and P = (X U TX, {f}, W, D). Note that P is a normal PDAP. 
We claim that P has a skeptical explanation iff @ is valid. 
(+) Assume E is a skeptical explanation for P. Let Xl = E f’ X, and let Yl s Y be 
arbitrary. Then, clearly 
A=Th(WuEuXlu~(X\Xl)uYlU~(Y\Yl)) 
is an extension of the default theory (W U E, D\{ $}). By semi-monotonicity of normal 
default theories ( [ 521; see Section 2)) (W U E, D) must have an extension B such that 
A C B. Clearly, B must be consistent. Moreover, since E is a skeptical explanation for 
P, f E B, and hence F E B. Consequently, Fxluvl is satisfiable. Since Yl is arbitrary, 
it follows that VYGIZ. Fxl is valid. Hence, @ is valid. 
(-&) Let Xl C X such that VY3Z. FXI is valid. Define E = Xl U 7(X\Xl). Clearly, 
W U E is consistent. Hence, every extension A of (E, D) is consistent; an extension 
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exists, since (E, D) is normal. Moreover, each such A contains Yl U -( Y\Yl) for some 
Yl z Y. From the characterization of A in terms of its generating defaults and the 
hypothesis that VY32. Fxi is valid, it follows that F is consistent with A. Consequently, 
$ E GD(A, (E,D)), and hence F E A; it follows f E A. Since the extension A was 
arbitrary, it follows that E is a skeptical explanation for P. This proves the claim, which 
also concludes the proof of (i) . 
To show (ii), add h to the hypotheses in an instance of P in (i), and ask if h is 
relevant; for (iii), add h to the hypotheses, f V h > q to the third component, change 
the manifestations to {q} and ask if h is necessary. Indeed, h is necessary iff P has no 
skeptical explanation. 0 
Theorem A.l. Let P = (H, M, W, D) be a PDAP. Deciding if E C H is a minimal 
credulous explanation E for P is DT-complete, with hardness even for normal P. 
Proof. It remains to show hardness. For that, consider PDAPs Pl = (0, {ql}, Wl, Dl) 
as in (1) and P2 = ({h}, {qz}, W2,02) as in (3) preceding Theorem 4.6, and assume 
that they are on distinct atoms. Then, {h} is a minimal credulous explanation of P3 = 
({h},{q~,q~},WlUW2,DlUD2) iffP1 hasacredulousexplanationand hisnecessary 
for P2. Since the latter problems are C!-hard and @-hard, respectively, and P3 is clearly 
normal, Dg-hardness of the problem follows. 0 
Theorem 4.11. Let P be a PDAP based on minimal credulous explanations. Then, 
Relevance is Zy-complete, and hardness holds even for normal P. 
Proof. Membership. A guess E for a minimal credulous explanation for P such that 
h E E can be verified by two calls to an II! oracle (cf. Theorems 4.6 and 4.10). Hence, 
the problem is in CT. 
Hardness. We outline a reduction from 
Let s and q be new atoms, and define 
deciding validity of a QBF @ = 3XVY3Z. F. 
w=0, 
D= 
z-s sAY:q TsATF:q 
-3-7 
Let P = (X U TX U Y U {s} ,X’ U {q} , K D); note that P is normal. 
Claim. s is relevant for a minimal credulous explanation iff Q, is valid. 
The following facts, which are straightforward, are useful for a proof of this claim: 
Fact 1. If E is a credulous explanation for P, then (i) x E E or TX E E, for each 
x E X; (ii) ifs E E, then Y C E; and (iii) ifs q! E, then 7s belongs to each extension 
of (WuE,D). 
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Fact 2. For each Xl C X, the set Exl = Xl U T( X\Xl ) U Y U {s} is a credulous 
explanation for P. (Indeed, the set Th( W U Exl U X’ U {q}) is an extension of (W U 
EXl,D).) 
Proof of the claim. (+) Relafunce of s implies by Facts 1 and 2 that for some Xl C 
X, Exl is a minimal credulous explanation. Thus, for each Yl C Y, the set Exl,yl = 
Xl U -I( X\Xl) U Yl is not a credulous explanation. Since W U Ex1.c is consistent, 
it follows by semi-monotonicity of normal default theories that (W U EXI,YI, D) has a 
consistent extension A that contains 
B = (1s) u Xl u $X\Xl) u Yl u +Y\Yl); 
however, q $ A (otherwise, Exl,yl would be an explanation). Thus, from the character- 
ization of A by its generating defaults, it follows that B y -F, i.e., B U F is consistent. 
Consequently, the formula Fxluri is satisfiable. It follows that 3XVY3Z. F is valid. 
(e) Let X1 2 X such that VY3Z. Fxl is valid. Then, EXI is a minimal credulous 
explanation for P. To show this, assume to the contrary that some smaller explanation 
E c Exl exists. Then, from Fact 1 we have s $ E. The default theory (W U E, D) must 
have an extension that contains q; by the properties of default logic, it follows that 1F 
is provable from Xl U -( X\Xl ) U Yl U -( Y\Y 1)) where Yl = Y rl E. It follows that 
VY3ZFxl is not valid. Contradiction. This proves the claim. Cl 
As P can be constructed in polynomial time, XT-hardness of the problem follows. q 
Theorem 4.12. Let P = (H, M, W, D) be a PDAP. Deciding if a skeptical explanation 
E for P is minimal is rI!-complete, with hardness holding even for normal P. 
Proof. Membership. A guess for a smaller skeptical explanation E’ c E can be verified 
with two calls to a 2; oracle, and hence deciding the existence of such an E’ is in CF. 
Consequently, the problem is in II;. 
Hardness. We describe here a reduction from deciding whether a QBF @ = VX3YVZ. F 
is valid. Let s and q be new atoms, and define 
sAX:q Ts:TFr\q 
4 ’ TFAq 
Let P = (X U {s}, {q}, 0, D). Check that E = X U { } s is a skeptical explanation for P. 
Claim. E is a minimal skeptical explanation for P iff @ is valid. 
In the proof of this claim, we use the following facts, which are easily established. 
Fact 3. E is the only skeptical explanation for P that contains s. 
Fact 4. For each Xl C_ X, (i) the default theory (Xl, D) has for each Yl 2 Y an 
extension containing Xl U l( X\Xl ) U Y 1 U l( Y\Y 1) cfollows from semi-monotonicity) ; 
(ii) each extension of (Xl, D) contains 1s. 
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Proof of the claim. (+) Let Xl s X. Then, by hypothesis, Xl is not a skeptical 
explanation. Hence, there exists some extension A of (Xl, D) such that q $! A, which 
implies by (ii) of Fact 4 that 1F A q $ A. From the characterization of A in terms 
of its generating defaults, it follows that Xl U l(X\Xl) U Yl U 7(Y\Yl) k F, where 
Yl = Y fl A. Thus, 3Y’v’Z. Fxl is valid. Since Xl is arbitrary, it follows that Q, is 
valid. 
(+) Assume that E is not minimal. Then, by Fact 3, some Xl 2 X exists which is 
a skeptical explanation. By (i) and (ii) of Fact 4, we conclude that for each Yl C Y, it 
holds that Xl U l(X\Xl) U Yl U l(Y\Yl) is consistent with 1F. Hence, VY3Z. ~Fxl 
is valid. This implies that @ is not valid. Thus, by contraposition, validity of @ implies 
that E is minimal. This proves the claim. 0 
The result follows. 0 
Theorem A.2. Given a PDAP P = (H, M, w D) and a subset E C H, deciding whether 
E is a minimal skeptical explanation for P is @-complete, with hardness holding even 
for normal P. 
Proof. Membership. If E is not a minimal skeptical explanation, then either E is not 
a skeptical explanation, which can be checked with two calls to a Xi oracle, or there 
exists a guess E’ c E such that E’ is a smaller skeptical explanation, which can be 
checked by another two calls to a Z; oracle. Hence, it follows that deciding whether E 
is not a minimal skeptical explanation is in C,, ‘- hence, deciding whether E is a minimal 
skeptical explanation is in II!. 
Hardness. Follows immediately from the reduction in the hardness part of the proof 
of Theorem 4.12: take E = X U {s}. q 
Theorem 4.13. Let P be a PDAP based on minimal skeptical explanations. Then, 
problem Relevance is Zi-complete, with hardness even for normal P. 
Proof. Membership. A guess for a minimal skeptical explanation E for P such that 
h E E can be verified with one call to a CF oracle (cf. Theorem A.2). 
Hardness. We outline a reduction from deciding validity of a QBF p = 3RVX3WZ. F, 
which is an extension to the reduction in the proof of Theorem 4.12. Let as there be s 
and q new atoms, and define 
Dl=Du 
{ 
r’ : r A r” -4 : yr A r” 
r A r” ’ yr A r/I 
JrGR , 
1 
where D is the same set of defaults as in the proof of Theorem 4.12. Define P = 
(H,R”U{q},@,Dl), where H= R’UTR’UXU{S}. Note that P is normal; if W would 
be empty, then P would be identical to the PDAP in the proof of Theorem 4.12. We 
observe the following facts on P: 
Fact 5. Let E be any skeptical explanation for P. Then, either r’ E E or Tr’ E E, but 
not both simultaneously, for each r E R. 
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Proof. Note that the manifestation Y” can be only explained by either r’ or -v’, which 
cannot be derived by applying defaults. Clearly, it is not possible that Y and 1~ are both 
in E. 0 
Claim. Let El & H and Rl 2 R such that 
El n (R’ u -RI) = Rl’ u l( R\Rl)‘. 
Then, El is a skeptical explanation for P iff E = El \( R’UTR’) is a skeptical explanation 
for the PDAP Pa = (Ha, MG, We, D Q, ) constructed for @ = VX3YVZ. FR, in the proof 
of Theorem 4.12. 
Proof. Let 02 be the set of defaults obtained from Dl by replacing -F A q with 
+RI Aq. 
(+) Each extension of (El, Dl) must contain Rl U -(R\Rl). (Otherwise, R” 
would not be explained.) From this, it is not difficult to see that (El, 02) has the same 
extensions as (El, D 1). Moreover, from the occurrences of r, r’ and r” in (El, 02)) 
it is clear that the extensions of (El, D2) restricted to the language over the atoms 
X U Y U Z U {s, q} are precisely the extensions of (E, Da). Hence, it follows that E is 
a skeptical explanation for PG. 
(+) Assume that E is a skeptical explanation of PQ. Let B be an arbitrary extension 
of (El, D 1). Clearly, B is consistent. To show that El is a skeptical explanation for P, 
it suffices to prove that R” U {q} C B. We consider two cases. 
(i) s E El. Then, s E E; since E is a skeptical explanation for PO, we conclude 
that X & E, and hence X C El. Consequently, q E B by the default y; moreover, 
R” C B since for each r E R, one of the defaults w and s is applicable. 
(Note that the default 7zFrtiq is not applicable.) 
(ii) s $ El. Then, 1s E B. Let Yl = B fl Y. Since E is a skeptical explanation for 
Pa, we conclude that the set 
E u {lF@ A q} u 7(X\E) U Yl U y(Y\Yl) u (7s) 
is consistent. This can be easily established by semi-monotonicity of normal default 
logic: start to build an extension of (E, Da) by applying the appropriate default from 
2 3 for each y E Y, after that all defaults 2, for x E X\E, and then 5; the default ?” ‘1 
7s’7F’Aq must be applicable thereafter, as this is the only possibility to join q to the +4q 
extension. Consequently, also the set 
C=ElU{rAr”~rER1}U{~rAr”~rER\R1}U{~FAq) 
U l(X\E) U Yl U +Y\Yl) U (1s) 
must be consistent. Thus, by the characterization of an extension in terms of its gener- 
ating defaults, we conclude that B = Th(C). Hence, it follows that R” U {q} 2 B. 
It follows that El is a skeptical explanation for P. This proves the claim. 0 
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From Fact 5 and the claim, it follows that s is relevant for some minimal skeptical 
explanation for P iff for some RI C R, the formula VX3YVZ. FRI is valid, i.e., ly 
is valid. As P is efficiently constructible from p, this proves 81-hardness. The result 
follows. 0 
We close this part of the appendix with a remark on the complexity of first-order 
default abduction problems under domain closure and unique names assumption (cf. 
Section 6). Most of the hardness results from above are proved by polynomial time 
transformations of evaluating particular quantified Boolean formulas that are hard for 
C! respectively II!. Note that such formulas can be seen as second-order propositional 
formulas, since the quantifiers are on propositional atoms. It is shown in [29] that 
evaluating second-order formulas of predicate logic over a fixed finite relational structure 
(i.e., a first-order structure with finite domain for a language without functions and 
constants) has precisely exponentially higher complexity, and yields problems hard for 
the exponential analogues Zg and IIF of 2: and III, respectively. 
Utilizing these results, the hardness proofs from above can be easily generalized to 
corresponding hardness proofs for the first-order case. In fact, a suitable replacement 
of QBFs by corresponding second-order predicate formulas is feasible. We show this 
on the example of the transformation in the proof of Theorem 4.9. Instead of the QBF 
@ = 3XVY3Z. F, we have a second-order predicate formula 
p = 3Pl.l . . ~~Pl,“,VP2,, ‘. .vp2,n*3pj,, . * .3p3,n,. C#J 
where the pi,j are predicate variables and 4 is a closed first-order formula (in which no 
function and constant symbols occur). 
Evaluating p on a fixed finite relational structure A is x:-hard [29]. A can be 
represented in default logic by the fixed first-order theory 
WA = {r(t) 1 A k r(t), r(t) is a ground atom} 
U {-r(t) ) A F r(t), r(t) is a ground atom} 
(i.e., WA yields the closed world assumption applied to the relations in A). Define now 
defaults 
D= 
(here thex=xi,..., x, is assumed to match the arity of pi,j) and a first-order DAP 
P = ({Pl,jf ‘Pl,j / j = 1,. . .Y ~l),{f),WdU{f*~},D)> 
where f is a new propositional atom. It holds that P has a skeptical explanation iff 
A /= P. This proves CF-hardness of Consistency for skeptical abduction in the first-order 
case. 
Similar generalizations are straightforward in the other proofs. 
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Appendix B. Proofs for tractable cases 
Lemma 5.1. Let (w D) be a Literal-Horn default theory, and let el, . . . , & be literals. 
Then, deciding (K D) I--C el A. . . A&, is possible in 0( m . n) time, where n is the length 
of the input. 
Proof. If W is not consistent (which holds iff it contains a pair of opposite literals) 
then (W D) I-, el A. . . A em; if Ii A . . . A e, is not satisfiable, then (W, D) l-C .C, A . . . A e,,, 
iff W is not consistent. Both consistency of W and satisfiability of lt A . . . A e,, can be 
checked in linear time; in what follows, we thus assume that W is consistent and that 






[eE {el,...,e,) or 
(eispositiveande@{Nb,,...,N&})] . 
1 
Note the important fact that H does not contain simultaneously clauses with opposite 
literal in the head, i.e., clauses p 1 e and y >N e (where p and/or y may be 
empty ) . 
Claim. (W D) has an extension containing Cl,. . . , C,,, iff H I- el A . . . A &. 
Note that for n = 1, i.e., a single literal et, H is the Horn theory of [ 35, Lemma 6.41, 
which states the claimed property for a single literal. 
H can be constructed in linear time from (W, D); notice that H is Horn. It is well 
known that for a Horn theory T and a literal f?, the test T k C can be decided in 
time linear in the length of T, e.g. by positive unit resolution, cf. [ 401. Consequently, 
deciding H k e, A ... A en, is possible in time linear in the length of H times m, 
and hence in time O(m . n). (In fact, the set of all positive literals e such that T I- 
e (i.e., the least model) can be computed in time linear in the length of T [40], 
and thus the bound could be sharpened to 0( (m- + 1)n) where m- is the number 
of negative literals e,.) Therefore, the lemma is an immediate consequence of this 
claim. 
Prior to the proof of the claim, define subsets HO, HI,. . . , Hi,. . . of H as follows: 
Ho = W, 
HI =Hou{cr>eEH\HoI Hobaa), 
Hi+ I = Hi U {a > e E H\Hi 1 Hi k cr}, 
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Note that the sequence (Hi), i 3 0, converges to Ui”, Hi; this set relates to H as 
follows. Since H is a Horn theory, it has a least model M; the following characterization 
of M is not difficult to establish: 
(B.1) 
i.e., the least model of H is given by the atoms x in the heads of the clauses with positive 
head (respectively positive facts) in HO, HI . . . . Indeed, let N = {x 1 cr > x E Uibo Hi}. 
Then, one can check that N is a model of H; moreover, by induction on i, one can show 
that M must contain all positive heads of the clauses in HO U.. . U Hi, and hence N is 
contained in M. 
Proof of the claim. (+) Assume that H k .f, A . . . A &. Define the set E by 
E=Th(W”MU(-xl=+, M+a, Mkx}). 
Notice that E is consistent. We claim that E is an extension of (K 0) such that Ci E E, 
for every i = 1, . . . , n, which proves the if-direction. To prove this claim, we first verify 
that !i E E, for every i = 1, . . . , n. If & is a positive literal, then & E M and hence, 
by definition of E, clearly & E E; otherwise, if !i is a negative literal lx, then, since 
H t- &, there must exist a clause (Y > 1.x in H such that M k a (for otherwise, a 
model of H in which x is true exists). Thus, 5 E D, M k a and M p x all hold; 
by definition, lx E E. 
It remains to show that E is an extension, i.e., E = IJS Ei, where the sets Ei are 
those in the definition of extension. We obtain 
El=Th(Ea)u 
a:e 
tl,~D, Eota, d$E 
= Th(Eo) u TX 1 
C 
?.-!-?! E D, EC, k a, x $ E 
TX 
u {x 1 (Y > x E H,} , 
Ei+l = Th(Ei) u TX I 7 ED, Eika, x$E U{XIa>XEHi+l}, 
Indeed, by induction on i, it is straightforward that the set of positive literals in Ei, Pi, 
is {x I a > x E Hi}. 
For i = 0, this is obvious. Consider thus i’ = i + 1, and first LY > x E Hi+l. If 
(Y > x E Hi, then by the induction hypothesis x E Ei, and hence x E &+I; otherwise, a 
default 7 E D exists, by the induction hypothesis Ei t- a, and since x E M, -LX @ E; 
consequently, x E Ei+l. It follows that: 
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contains !I, . . . ,e, (take any extension of (E\{Yc} U {x},D)). Using e.g. a (well) 
ordering on the defaults D, one can single out a particular such extension. This gives 
rise to a monotonic operator, which takes E to an extension E’ with a larger part of 
positive atoms; the least fixpoint of this operator is an extension that satisfies (B.6). 
This justifies our assumption. 
Let MO be the set of positive literals in E. We claim that MO is the least model of H 
(i.e.,Mo=M={xIcu>xEU~Hi}>. 
We proof this claim showing by induction on i 2 0 that 
i.e., the positive literals in EL are the positive heads of clauses in Hi. Since M = IJ~{x 
cy 3 x E Hi}, the claim is an immediate consequence thereof. 
(Basis) For i = 0, we have EO = W and HO = W. Thus, the statement is clearly true 
(Induction) For i’ = i + 1, we have 
= {X ( (Y 3 x E Hi} U x 1 y E D, Ei 1 CY, _,$E}. 
The induction hypothesis is applied to obtain the left expression on the second line. 
Consider x E B. Then, TX 6 W and either x E {ei , . . . , en,,} or x $! {- Ci , . . . , N l?,} 
(as .$ E E, x E E, and E must be consistent). Since z?Zi t- (Y, it follows from the 
induction hypothesis that Hi I- cy. Therefore, LY > x E Hi+], which implies: 
X E {Y I cX 3 Y E Hi+l} . (B.7) 
On the other hand, consider any (Y > y E Hi+i. If y E {x 1 p > x E Hi}, it is clear 
from the equation above that y E Ma n Th( Ei+l). Otherwise, if LY > x E Hi+,, then 
H; t- cx, which by the induction hypothesis implies that Ei I- a. Moreover, either (a) 
Y E {b,... ,e,,) or 03) Y $ {- el,...,N &}. In case (a), y E E and ly # E, as 
Eke, A- . A em; thus y E B. In case (b) we obtain from the assumption (B.6) on E 
that my +! E\W; moreover, by the definition of H, -my $ W. Therefore, -y I$ E, which 
implies y E B. Since y E B holds in both cases (a) and (b), it follows that 
Y E MonTh(Ei+l). 
Now (B.7) and (B.8) imply 
(J3.8) 
MofITh(Ei+l) ={X ICY >X E Hi+,}; 
this proves the induction step and the claim Mu = M. 
Eventually, we verify that H 1 ei for every i = 1,. . . , n. If ei is positive, then 
& E Mu = M; therefore, H t- ei. Otherwise, ei is a negative literal lx. If !i E W, then 
ei E H and therefore H I- ei; if ei $ W, then some y E D exists such that E t- a. 
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Since ei E E, we have N Ci $ W; hence, it follows Q > .!?i E H. Moreover, since (Y is 
a conjunction of positive literals, E I- a and Me = M implies M k a; consequently, 
H k cr. Since LY > !i E H, it follows H t- 4. 
This concludes the proof of the only-if-direction and the proof of the lemma. 0 
Proposition B.l. Given a Krom-pf-normal default theory (W D) and literals el, . . . , &, , 
deciding whether (W D) ‘rC e, A . . . A e,, is NP-complete. 
Proof. Concerning membership, a consistent extension E such that !I,. . . ,!,, E E can 
be guessed and verified in polynomial time. Indeed, since (W, D) is prerequisite free and 
normal, a guess D’ c D for GD( E, 7’) is proper if C = W U concl( 0’) is consistent, 
C t- Ci, for all i = 1,. . . , m, and no $ E D\D’ exists such that C U {p} is consistent. 
Since W is Krom and all formulas in defaults are Krom, each of these tests can be done 
in polynomial time. (Indeed, satisfiability of a Krom theory can be decided in linear 
time [3,25].) This proves membership in NP. 
To show hardness, we reduce the classical satisfiability problem (SAT) to this problem 
as follows. For a set of propositional clauses C = {Cl, . . . , Cm} where Ci = li, V. . . Ve,,, , 
define 
D= 
: e, A Ci - 1 i= 1,. :.X 
e, A Ci 
..,m, j= l,..., ni -,: IxoccursinC 
x TX 
where the ci, i = 1,. . . , m, are new atoms. It is easy to see that (8, D) kC CI A . . . A c,, 
iff C is satisfiable. Since D is efficiently obtained from C, this proves NP-hardness. 0 
From the proof of this proposition, the following result can be easily established. 
Corollary B.2. Deciding if a given PDAP P = (H, M, W D) has a credulous explanation 
is NP-hard, even if all defaults are prerequisite free, W = H = 0, and M is a set of 
atoms. 
Proposition B.3. Given a Krom-pf-normal default theory (W D) and a literal C, de- 
ciding whether (W D) kS C is co-NP-complete. 
Proof. Membership in co-NP follows from the fact that a guess for an extension E such 
that e $ E can be verified in polynomial time. 
To show co-NP-hardness, we reduce the unsatisfiability problem (UNSAT) to this 
problem: Decide whether a given set of propositional clauses C = {Ct , . . . , C,,}, Ci = 
ei, V . . V Ci,,, is not satisfiable. Define a set of defaults D by 
D= 
: CA - ei, A . . . A - e,, 
CA N ei, A . . . A - e,,, 
:X,$]noccursinC , 
X > 
where c is a new atom. It holds that (8, D) t--s c iff C is unsatisfiable. Since D can be 
constructed efficiently, this proves the result. 0 
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Proposition B.4. Relevance based on minimal credulous explanations for PDAPs P = 
(H, M, W D) where (W D) is literal-Horn is NP-complete. 
Proof. Membership. A guess for a minimal credulous explanation E such that h E E 
can be verified in polynomial time, by testing that E is a credulous extension and 
that (E\{h’}, M, W D) has no credulous explanation, for every h’ E E; both tests are 
polynomial, as follows from Lemma 5.1 and Theorem 5.3. 
Hardness. The hardness part is a simple reduction of abductive reasoning from clas- 
sical theories (cf. [ 221 ) : given a definite Horn PAP (V H, M, T), decide if a certain 
hypothesis h is relevant in a minimal explanation. Here T is a set of definite Horn 
clauses al A . . . A a, > ao on a set of variables V, H g V, A4 C V, and the underly- 
ing inference is classical consequence I-. The constructed PDAP is Pr = (H, M, W D), 
where W = {u E V 1 a E T} and D = {a’A’.~Aak’b 1 al A . .. A ak > b E T}. Ob- 
serve that the credulous explanations for P’ coincide with the skeptical ones, since 
(W U E, D) has a unique extension for every E G H. It is easy to see that the credulous 
explanations for P’ coincide with the explanations for P. Therefore, h is relevant in 
a minimal credulous explanation for P’ iff h is relevant in a minimal explanation for 
P. Since deciding the latter is NP-hard [ 221, Relevance for literal-Horn PDAPs is also 
NP-hard. 0 
Lemma 5.5. Let S be a (propositional) Krom theory and e a literal, and let L = 
(4 I . . . , &} be a set of literuls such that (i) S U L is consistent, (ii) S U L I- e and 
S lj C Then, S u {e,} k e for some ei E L. 
Proof. This is obvious if e E L. Assume thus that e $ L. Consider any resolution 
proof for e from S U L. (Such a proof must exist.) In the last step, we have that 
{e} is the resolvent of clauses Ct and Cz that have a resolution proof from S U L. 
It is easy to see that a clause C of size 2 has a resolution proof from a consistent 
Krom theory T iff it has a resolution proof from the set T’ G T of all clauses in 
T of size 2. Hence, we conclude that without loss of generality C2 is a literal, i.e., 
c, = {e,- eo} and C2 = {lo} ( f or otherwise, S 1 & would hold). Since S U L is 
Krom, Ci has a resolution proof from S, and therefore S U {too) I- C. By induction 
on the length r of a shortest resolution proof for e from S U L, we conclude that 
to E L. Indeed, if r = 0, then .eO E L; if r > 0, then la $ L; since es has a shorter 
resolution proof than e, it follows from the induction hypothesis that S U {e’} t- to 
where e’ E L; hence, S U {e’} k e, which concludes the induction and proves the 
lemma. q 
Proposition 5.6. Let T = (W, D) be a Krom-pf-normal default theory and let L = 
{e,, . . . , t,,} be u set of literals. Let Ll = (4 E L 1 W If &}. Then, T t, e, A . . . A e,, i# 
(a) Ll is empty, or 
(b) there exists a subset Dl & D such that 
(1) ID11 G ILlI, 
(2) W U lit( D 1) is consistent, and 
(3) WUlit(D1) Fe,foreucheE Ll. 
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Proof. (+) If T I-, e, then there exists an extension E of T such that L C E. By 
the characterization of E in terms of its generating defaults (see Section 2), E = 
Th( W U lit( GD( E, T) ) ) . Consider two cases. 
(i) E is not consistent. Then, by the well-known properties of default extensions 
[52], W is not consistent. Thus, from the definition, we have Ll = 0; hence, (a) 
holds. 
(ii) E is consistent. Then W U lit(GD( E,T)) is consistent. From Lemma 5.5, we 
infer that for each C E Ll there exists some p E lit( GD( E,T)) such that W U {p} t 4. 
Consequently, there exists a subset Dl C GD( E, T), and hence D 1 5 D, such that 
ID11 < ILlI, WUlit(D1) is consistent and WUlit(D1) be, for each e E Ll. Hence, 
(b) holds. This proves the only-$-direction. 
(KG) Assume that (a) holds, i.e., Ll = 8. This means W t t? for each f? E L. Since 
W C E for every extension E of T and E is deductively closed, it follows that L C E for 
every extension of T. As T is normal, an extension exists, and hence T kc Cl A. . . A &. 
Assume now that (b) does hold, i.e. for some D 1 & D we have 1 D 11 < 1 Ll 1, 
W U lit( D 1) is consistent, and W U lit( D 1) k !? for every e E Ll. Since T is prerequisite 
free and normal, it follows from semi-monotonicity that T has a consistent extension E 
such that W U lit( D 1) & E. Since E is deductively closed, L C E; it follows T t-C !. 
This proves the result. 0 
Theorem 5.7. Let T = (W D) be a Krom-pf-normal default theory, and let L = 
{e,, . . . , &,} be a set of literals. Then, T I-.c el A . A &, can be decided using 
Krom-PFN-Cred-Inf in 0( ) D 1”’ . m e n) time, where n is the length of the input. 
Proof. Correctness of the algorithm follows from Proposition 5.6. Concerning the com- 
plexity, satisfiability of a Krom theory can be decided in linear time [3,25]. Conse- 
quently, also inference of a literal from a Krom theory can be decided in linear time. 
Therefore, Ll can be computed in 0( m . n) time. The for-loop checks at most I DI IL1 1 < 
I DI”’ sets Dl; for each D 1, computing S is possible in O(n) time, and the tests S y I, 
St ei take O(m.n) time. Hence, the overall running time is O(m~n+lDI”‘(n+m.n)), 
which is 0( IDI”’ . ma n). 17 
Theorem 5.8. Let P = (H, M, W, D) be a PDAP based on credulous explanations 
such that M = {eI , . . . ,!k} is small and (W D) is Krom-pf-normal. Then, Consistency, 
Relevance, and Necessity can be solved in 0( ) D I b . n) time, where n is the length of P. 
Proof. Construct a Krom-pf-normal default theory T2 = (W2, D2), given by 
where each ch is a new propositional atom. It is not hard to see that P has an explanation 
iff W2 is consistent and T2 kc Ii A. . .A&. Clearly, W2, 02, and T2 can be constructed in 
O(n) time. Consistency of W2 can be checked in linear time [ 3,251 and by Lemma 5.2, 
T2 k-c e, A *. . A & can be decided in 0( I D2jb . n’) time, where n’ is the length 
of T2 (which is O(n)). Hence, Consistency can be decided in 0( I Dlb . n) time. By 
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Corollary 4.3, Relevance and Necessity can be easily reduced to Consistency respectively 
its complement in O(n) time; hence, these problems are also solvable in 0( lDlb . n) 
time. I7 
Proposition 5.9. Let E be any minimal credulous explanation for a PDAP P = 
(H, M, W D) where (W D) is K ram-pf-normal and M is Jinite. Then, [El 6 1 MI. 
Proof. Let E be any credulous explanation. Then, the default theory Tl = (W U E, D) 
has a consistent extension A such that M c E. By the characterization of extensions, we 
haveA=Th(WUEUL),whereL=lit(GD(A,Tl)).Hence, WUEULisconsistentand 
W U E U L t- C, for each ! E M. From Lemma 5.5, it follows that for each ! E M such 
that W y e, there exists a p.e E EU L such that WU {pe} b l. Fix any such pe for each e, 
and let EO & E be the set EO = {,!.Q 1 t E M} n E, notice that jEO/ < [MI. Then, EO is a 
credulous explanation for P. Indeed, the default theory T2 = (WUEO, D) has a consistent 
extension which contains M: since the set W U EO U lit(GD( A, Tl)) is consistent and 
all defaults in D are prerequisite free and normal, T2 has a consistent extension E3 
containing W U EO U lit( GD( A, Tl ) ) . Moreover, since W U EO U lit( GD( A, Tl ) ) t- ! for 
each C E M, we have M C E3. Thus, EO is a credulous explanation of P. 
Since E was arbitrary, it follows that for each explanation E for P, there exists an 
explanation EO c E such that lEOI < 1 MI. In particular, if E is a minimal explanation, 
then E = EO, and hence IEl < [MI. This proves the result. 0 
Theorem 5.10. Given a PDAP P = (H, M, W D) where (W D) is Krom-pf-normal 
and M is small, all minimal credulous explanations for P can be computed in time 
O(IHlb.lDlb.n), wheren isthelengthofp. 
Proof. Consider algorithm All-KPFN-Min-Cred-Exp. In total, at most IHlb subsets 
E C H are considered. For each set E, the test W U E y I takes O(n) time ( W U E 
is Krom) ; the tests E’ $ Min_Expl can be done in 0( 2’ . log IMinXxpll ) time, if 
MinExpl is stored in a standard search data structure (e.g., an AVL-tree) on which 
EO $ Min-Expl is checked for every subset EO c E. The test Krom-PFN-Cred- 
Inf(WUE,D,q5) takesO(IDlb+n). S ince IMin_Expll is bounded by I Hlb, this amounts 
to O( lHjb. (2’1og lHlb + lDlb. n)) time. Building and maintaining the data structure 
for Min_Expl takes in total O(IHlb.loglHlb) time. Since loglHlb= bloglH[ is O(n), 
it follows that total running time of the algorithm is 0( I Hlb . I Dlb . n). q 
Proposition B.S. Given a first-order Krom-pf-normal default theory T = (W D) and 
a ground literal C, deciding whether T l--c C is NP-hard, even if all formulas in W are 
(universally quanti$ed) atoms and D contains a single default. 
Proof. Transform the classical satisfiability problem (SAT) into this problem as follows. 
Let C = {Cl,. . . , Cm} be a propositional clause set on atoms al, . . . , a,,, where without 
loss of generality no atom occurs positively and negatively in the same clause, and 
neither all clauses are positive or negative. For each clause Ci in C, put the formula 
& = Vxt . . .Vx,.p(tl, . . . , t,,) in W, where 
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i 
0, if Uj E Cj; 
tj= 1, if ‘Uj E Cj; 
Xj9 otherwise. 
In D, put the single default d = ‘$:~,‘,‘,‘;;;~;~~~, where s is a propositional atom. Intu- 
itively, each ground atom p( tt , . . . , t,,), where ti E (0, l}, corresponds to a truth value 
assignment to the propositional atoms al, . . . , a, such that ai is true if ti = 1 and ai = 0 
if ti = 0. Each formula +i describes all truth assignments that do not satisfy clause Ci; 
the default d is applicable precisely if there is a truth assignment that is compatible with 
each clause Ci, i.e., if it satisfies C. Therefore, C is satisfiable if and only if (K D) t--c s. 
This proves NP-hardness. 0 
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